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Marriage, Wealth, and Unemployment Duration: A Gender Asymmetry Puzzle

Author

Listed:
  • Lentz, Rasmus

    (Boston University)

  • Tranæs, Torben

    (VIVE - The Danish Centre for Applied Social Science)

Abstract
This note presents evidence of the following gender asymmetry: the job-finding effort of married men and women is affected by the income of their spouses in opposite directions. For women, spouse income influences job finding negatively, just as own wealth does: the more the man earns and the wealthier the woman is, the longer it takes for her to find a job. The contrary is the case for men, where spouse income affects job finding positively: the more the wife earns, the faster the husband finds a job. This is so despite the fact that greater own wealth also prolongs unemployment spells for men. These findings are hard to reconcile with the traditional economic model of the family.

Suggested Citation

  • Lentz, Rasmus & Tranæs, Torben, 2005. "Marriage, Wealth, and Unemployment Duration: A Gender Asymmetry Puzzle," IZA Discussion Papers 1607, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1607
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp1607.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yann Algan & Arnaud Cheron & Jean-Olivier Hairault & Francois Langot, 2003. "Wealth Effect on Labor Market Transitions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 156-178, January.
    2. Rasmus Lentz & Torben Tranas, 2005. "Job Search and Savings: Wealth Effects and Duration Dependence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(3), pages 467-490, July.
    3. Rasmus Lentz, 2009. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Estimated Job Search Model with Savings," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(1), pages 37-57, January.
    4. John M. Abowd & Patrick Corbel & Francis Kramarz, 1999. "The Entry And Exit Of Workers And The Growth Of Employment: An Analysis Of French Establishments," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(2), pages 170-187, May.
    5. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1997. "Match Quality, New Information, and Marital Dissolution," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 293-329, January.
    6. Svarer, Michael, "undated". "Determinants of Divorce in Denmark," Economics Working Papers 2002-19, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    7. Bloemen, Hans G & Stancanelli, Elena G F, 2001. "Individual Wealth, Reservation Wages, and Transitions into Employment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 400-439, April.
    8. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/9704 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Heckman, James & Singer, Burton, 1984. "A Method for Minimizing the Impact of Distributional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 271-320, March.
    10. Meyer, Bruce D, 1990. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 757-782, July.
    11. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/9704 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Lammers, Marloes, 2014. "The effects of savings on reservation wages and search effort," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 83-98.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    gender asymmetries; wealth effects on job finding; unemployment duration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
    • J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers

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