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Beschäftigungssicherung durch Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung

Author

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  • Carstensen, Vivian
Abstract
Der vorliegende Beitrag begründet die Vorteilhaftigkeit von Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung bei Produktmarktunsicherheiten theoretisch über die Existenz von Arbeitszeitkonten. Das Arbeitszeitkonten Modell kombiniert dabei effizienzlohn und versicherungstheoretische Aspekte. Die Lösungen sind nachverhandlungsstabil und spot implementierbar. Unter dieser Voraussetzung sind Komplementaritäten zwischen flexiblen Arbeitszeiten und verschiedenen anderen personalpolitischen Maßnahmen nachweisbar: ein innerbetriebliches Informations und Kommunikationssystem, Weiterbildungsinvestitionen und Gruppenarbeit verstärken die positiven Effekte.

Suggested Citation

  • Carstensen, Vivian, 1999. "Beschäftigungssicherung durch Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-228, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    • Handle: RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-228
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    File URL: http://diskussionspapiere.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/pdf_bib/dp-228.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Koch, Susanne, 2001. "Arbeitszeit und Beschäftigung im gesamtwirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang : Arbeitszeitfragen und ihre Behandlung in ökonomischen Modellen: Literaturüberblick und Forschungsperspektiven (Working time and e," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 34(1), pages 28-44.
    2. Koch, Susanne, 2001. "Arbeitszeit und Beschäftigung im gesamtwirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang : Arbeitszeitfragen und ihre Behandlung in ökonomischen Modellen: Literaturüberblick und Forschungsperspektiven (Working time and e," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 34(1), pages 28-44.
    3. Koch, Susanne, 2001. "Arbeitszeit und Beschäftigung im gesamtwirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang : Arbeitszeitfragen und ihre Behandlung in ökonomischen Modellen: Literaturüberblick und Forschungsperspektiven (Working time and e," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 34(1), pages 28-44.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arbeitszeitkonten; Risikoteilung; Effizienzlöhne; Beschäftigungsgarantien; Nachverhandlungsstabilität Komplementaritäten;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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