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Geography, Transparency and Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Mayshar, Joram
  • Moav, Omer
  • Neeman, Zvika
Abstract
We propose a theory by which geographic variations in the transparency of the production process explain cross-regional differences in the scale of the state, in its hierarchical structure, and in property rights over land. The key linkage between geography and these institutions, we posit, is via the effect of transparency on the state's extractive capacity. We apply our theory to explain institutional differences between ancient Egypt and ancient Upper and Lower Mesopotamia. We also discuss the relevance of our theory to analyses of the deep rooted factors affecting economic development and the growth of taxation in the modern age.

Suggested Citation

  • Mayshar, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika, 2013. "Geography, Transparency and Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9625
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    Cited by:

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    2. Jeffry Frieden & Arthur Silve, 2023. "The political reception of innovations," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 595-628, July.
    3. Oded Galor & Ömer Özak, 2016. "The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(10), pages 3064-3103, October.
    4. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Mark Koyama & Youhong Lin & Tuan-Hwee Sng, 2023. "The Fractured-Land Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 138(2), pages 1173-1231.
    5. Huning, Thilo R. & Wahl, Fabian, 2023. "You reap what you know: Appropriability and the origin of European states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    6. Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. & Piccone, M., 2022. "The Emergence of Enforcement," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2250, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Melissa Rubio-Ramos & Christian Isendahl & Ola Olsson, 2024. "The Political Economy of Bread and Circuses: Weather Shocks and Classic Maya Monument Construction," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 342, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    8. Matranga, Andrea, 2017. "The Ant and the Grasshopper: Seasonality and the Invention of Agriculture," MPRA Paper 76626, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Ho, Hoang-Anh, 2023. "Land rights in historical Vietnam: Theory and evidence," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    10. Nils-Petter Lagerlöf, 2021. "Multiple steady statehood: the roles of productive and extractive capacities," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 113-152, June.
    11. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pablo Hernández & Sebastián Mazzuca, 2015. "The Paradox of Civilization: Pre-Institutional Sources of Security and Prosperity," NBER Working Papers 21829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2016. "Statehood, democracy and preindustrial development," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 58-72.
    13. Hoang-Anh Ho, 2020. "Tying peasants to their land: The rise and fall of private property rights in historical Vietnam," eabh Papers 20-01, The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH).
    14. Melissa Rubio-Ramos & Christian Isendahl & Ola Olsson, 2024. "The Political Economy of Bread and Circuses: Weather Shocks and Classic Maya Monument Construction," CESifo Working Paper Series 11439, CESifo.
    15. Hoang-Anh Ho & Peter Martinsson & Ola Olsson, 2022. "The origins of cultural divergence: evidence from Vietnam," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 45-89, March.
    16. Benati, Giacomo & Guerriero, Carmine & Zaina, Federico, 2022. "The origins of political institutions and property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 946-968.
    17. Ho, Hoang-Anh & Martinsson, Peter & Olsson, Ola, 2017. "The Origins of Cultural Divergence: Evidence from a Developing Country," Working Papers in Economics 714, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2018.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Geography; Institutions; Land tenure; State capacity; State concentration; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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