WO2005042317A1 - 車両セキュリティ装置及びidコード管理装置 - Google Patents
車両セキュリティ装置及びidコード管理装置 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005042317A1 WO2005042317A1 PCT/JP2004/016309 JP2004016309W WO2005042317A1 WO 2005042317 A1 WO2005042317 A1 WO 2005042317A1 JP 2004016309 W JP2004016309 W JP 2004016309W WO 2005042317 A1 WO2005042317 A1 WO 2005042317A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- code
- vehicle
- security device
- communication
- vehicle security
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/002—Locking of control actuating or transmitting means
- B60R25/003—Locking of control actuating or transmitting means locking of control actuating means
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/01—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles operating on vehicle systems or fittings, e.g. on doors, seats or windscreens
- B60R25/04—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles operating on vehicle systems or fittings, e.g. on doors, seats or windscreens operating on the propulsion system, e.g. engine or drive motor
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/2036—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off by using the door logic and door and engine unlock means
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/209—Remote starting of engine
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R2325/00—Indexing scheme relating to vehicle anti-theft devices
- B60R2325/10—Communication protocols, communication systems of vehicle anti-theft devices
- B60R2325/108—Encryption
Definitions
- Vehicle security device and ID code management device are configured to manage Vehicle security device and ID code management device
- the present invention relates to a security device, and more particularly, to a vehicle security device that permits or prohibits operation of a vehicle device such as an engine and an ID code management device used in the vehicle security device.
- Patent Document 1 discloses an example of an immobilizer system for preventing a vehicle from being stolen.
- the immobilizer system includes a code collation device arranged in a vehicle.
- the code collation device collates the identification code to which the ignition key force is also transmitted with the identification code set in the vehicle.
- the code collator permits the engine to start if the two identification codes match, and prohibits the engine from starting if the two identification codes do not match.
- a legitimate ignition key has an identification code that matches the identification code of the vehicle and allows the engine to be started.
- a third party who does not have such a proper ignition key cannot drive the vehicle. In this way, the immobilizer system prevents the vehicle from being stolen.
- Patent Document 2 discloses an example of an engine start permission mechanism having a smart induction function.
- the engine start permission mechanism having the smart induction function permits the start of the engine when the user brings the portable device corresponding to the vehicle into the vehicle. According to such an engine start permission mechanism, the user is released from the troublesome operation of inserting the mechanical key of the portable device into the key cylinder and the like, and the operating force is released.
- engine start permission mechanism 100 includes a portable device 101 and a communication control device 102 arranged in a vehicle.
- the communication control device 102 includes an electronic control unit (smart ECU) 103 for smart induction, an electronic control unit (immobilizer ECU) 104 for immobilizer, and an electronic control unit (engine ECU) 105 for engine control.
- the portable device 101 and the smart ECU 103, the smart ECU 103 and the immobilizer ECU 104, and the immobilizer ECU 104 and the end The encryption code is communicated with the gin ECU 105 and the identification codes are collated. If the identification codes match in all of the plurality of encrypted communication, the engine ECU 105 permits the engine to be started. For this reason, the security level of the vehicle is secured at a high level.
- the present invention provides a vehicle security device capable of improving the security level of a vehicle, and an ID code management device used for the vehicle security device.
- Patent document 1 JP-A-10-157571
- Patent Document 2 Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2002-295089
- a vehicle security device connected to a vehicle device and communicating with a portable device.
- the vehicle security device includes a first communication means for performing first encrypted communication with the portable device for a first mutual authentication, and a first code and a second code connected to the first communication means.
- ID code management means that does not communicate with the first code, and ID code management means that performs second encryption communication for the first mutual communication with the second communication means using the first code;
- the second communication means for performing the third cipher communication for the third mutual authentication with the ID code management means using the ID code management means, and when all of the first, second, and third mutual authentications are established, And second communication means for permitting operation of the vehicle device.
- a vehicle security device connected to a vehicle device and communicating with a portable device having a portable device code.
- the vehicle security device includes a first electronic control unit that has a vehicle code and a first code, and has a first code and a second code that is connected to the first electronic control unit and that also receives the portable code.
- An ID code box for transmitting and receiving the first code to and from the first electronic control unit, and a second electronic control unit having the second code for transmitting and receiving the ID code box and the second code.
- the portable device code matches the vehicle code
- the first code of the first electronic control unit matches the first code of the ID code box
- the second code of the ID code box matches the second code. If the second code of the electronic control unit matches, the operation of the vehicle device is permitted.
- an ID code management device used in a vehicle security device connected to a vehicle device.
- the vehicle security device includes a first communication unit that performs first encrypted communication with the portable device for the first mutual authentication, and a second communication unit that prohibits operation of the vehicle device when the first mutual authentication is not established.
- the ID code management device manages the first code and the second code without communicating with the portable device, and uses the first code to communicate with the first communication means and the second encryption device for the second mutual authentication. The communication is performed, and the third encryption communication for the third mutual authentication is performed with the second communication means using the second code. If the third mutual authentication is not established, the vehicle security device prohibits the operation of the vehicle device.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a conventional vehicle security device.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of a vehicle security device according to one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of a vehicle security device according to another embodiment of the present invention.
- the vehicle theft prevention system 1 includes a portable device 10 possessed by a user and having a communication function, and a vehicle security device 11 mounted on the vehicle.
- the vehicle security device 11 (specifically, the transmission / reception unit 12 of the vehicle security device 11) transmits a request signal to the portable device 10.
- the portable device 10 has a portable device code unique to the portable device 10 (different for each portable device).
- mobile device 10 encrypts the code signal including the mobile device code, and transmits the encrypted code signal.
- the vehicle security device 11 includes a transmitting / receiving unit 12, a smart ECU 13 functioning as a first communication unit, an ID code box 14 functioning as an ID code management unit, and a second communication unit connected to the ID code box 14.
- An engine ECU 15 functioning as a means is provided. Of these components, at least the ID code box 14 and the engine ECU 15 are located at locations where they cannot be easily removed from the vehicle.
- the transmission / reception unit 12, smart ECU 13, ID code box 14, and engine ECU 15 are connected by wire.
- the smart ECU 13 includes a plurality of connectors connected to a plurality of control units (all not shown) such as a steering lock mechanism or a body ECU for locking and unlocking the door.
- the smart ECU 13 has a function of a smart ECU and a function of an immobilizer ECU in a conventional vehicle security device (engine start permission mechanism).
- the smart ECU 13 supplies a request signal for requesting the transmission of the portable device code to the transmission / reception unit 12.
- the transmission / reception unit 12 includes an antenna and a vehicle transmission / reception circuit (not shown).
- the transmission / reception unit 12 receives the signal transmitted from the portable device 10, demodulates the received signal, and supplies the demodulated received signal to the smart ECU 13. Further, upon receiving the request signal from the smart ECU 13, the transmission / reception unit 12 modulates the request signal and transmits the demodulated request signal via the antenna.
- the smart ECU 13, the ID code box 14, and the engine ECU 15 include a CPU (not shown).
- the smart ECU 13 includes a volatile memory 13a (for example, RAM) that functions as a storage unit.
- the memory 13a stores a first code for collation in advance.
- the smart ECU 13 has a vehicle code unique to the vehicle security device 11 (different for each vehicle security device).
- the smart ECU 13 decodes the received signal supplied from the transmission / reception unit 12. Subsequently, the smart ECU 13 checks the portable device code of the portable device 10 included in the received signal with its own vehicle code. In this way, the portable device 10 and the smart E Mutual authentication is performed with the CU13 by communication using encrypted signals (first encrypted communication). When mutual authentication in the first encrypted communication is established by matching the portable device code with the vehicle code, the smart ECU 13 determines that the portable device 10 is authentic.
- the ID code box 14 does not communicate with the portable device 10.
- the ID code box 14 includes a communication circuit, a CPU, and a non-volatile memory (neither is shown).
- the ID code box 14 includes a circuit for controlling a vehicle device (for example, a door, an engine 16, a car audio system).
- the memory of the ID code box 14 stores one or more codes used for mutual authentication with another device.
- the memory of the ID code box 14 stores a first code and a second code.
- the memory of the ID code box 14 may store the vehicle code in addition to the first code and the second code.
- the second encrypted communication is performed between the smart ECU 13 and the ID code box 14, and the first code of the smart ECU 13 and the first code of the ID code box 14 are collated to perform mutual authentication. Is This mutual authentication may be performed by either the smart ECU 13 or the ID code box 14.
- Engine ECU 15 stores a second code.
- the third encrypted communication is performed between the engine ECU 15 and the ID code box 14, the second code of the engine ECU 15 and the second code of the ID code box 14 are collated, and mutual authentication is performed. This mutual authentication may be performed by either the engine ECU 15 or the ID code box 14.
- the communication circuit of the ID code box 14 uses the first code used for mutual authentication with the smart ECU 13 in the second cipher communication performed between the smart ECU 13 and the ID code box 14 as an instruction from the CPU. Send or receive based on Further, the communication circuit transmits or receives the second code used for mutual authentication with the engine ECU 15 based on the instruction of the CPU in the third encrypted communication performed between the engine ECU 15 and the ID code box 14. .
- the engine ECU 15 is connected to an engine (vehicle device) 16 and controls the engine 16.
- the engine ECU 15 permits the engine 16 to start when mutual authentication is established in all of the first encrypted communication, the second encrypted communication, and the third encrypted communication. That is, The gin ECU 15 confirms whether the mutual authentication between the portable device 10 and the smart ECU 13, the mutual authentication between the smart ECU 13 and the ID code box 14, and the mutual authentication between the ID code box 14 and the engine ECU 15 have been completed. Allow engine 16 to start if all mutual certifications are successful. That is, when it is determined that all of the portable device 10, the smart ECU 13, the ID code box 14, and the engine ECU 15 are authentic by a plurality of mutual authentications, the engine ECU 15 permits the engine 16 to start.
- the memory 13a of the smart ECU 13 is volatile. Therefore, for example, when power is not supplied to the smart ECU 13 due to an instantaneous interruption of the battery, the first code stored in the memory 13a disappears. After that, the smart ECU 13 that has received the electric power uses the vehicle code (third code) used for the first encrypted communication and the arithmetic expression unique to the smart ECU 13 (different for each smart ECU) to convert the first code. Generate. Therefore, even if an unexpected situation such as an instantaneous interruption of the battery occurs, the second encryption communication is performed, and the user can start the engine 16 and run the vehicle.
- the smart ECU 13 that receives the power after the power is not supplied generates the first code using the arithmetic expression.
- the arithmetic expression used at this time differs for each smart ECU. Therefore, when the smart ECU 13 is replaced, the first code generated by the smart ECU 13 after replacement is different from the first code generated by the smart ECU 13 before replacement, and the second encrypted communication is not established. . Therefore, the engine ECU 15 prohibits the engine 16 from starting. That is, a third party cannot run the vehicle if the smart ECU is exchanged illegally.
- the ID code box 14 includes a nonvolatile memory. Therefore, for example, even when power is not supplied to the ID code box 14 due to a momentary interruption of the knowledge, the first code and the second code stored in the memory of the ID code box 14 are lost. It is held. Therefore, the vehicle security device 11 according to one embodiment has the following effects.
- the second encrypted communication is performed between the smart ECU 13 and the ID code box 14, and mutual authentication is performed using the first code of each of the smart ECU 13 and the ID code box 14. For this reason, if the authorized smart ECU 13 is replaced with another smart ECU, the first code of the replaced smart ECU is different from the first code of the ID code box 14, so that mutual authentication is not established. Become. If mutual authentication between the smart ECU 13 and the ID code box 14 is not established, the engine ECU 15 prohibits the engine 16 from starting even if mutual authentication with the ID code box 14 is established through the third encryption communication. Further, since the ID code box 14 does not communicate with the portable device 10, a function for the communication is unnecessary, and the ID code box 14 has a relatively small size.
- the ID code box 14 is easily installed in a place where it is difficult to remove the vehicle power, which is hardly subject to restrictions on arrangement and wiring. Therefore, the security level of the vehicle is improved by installing the ID code box 14 in a place where it is difficult to remove the vehicle.
- the smart ECU 13 includes a volatile memory 13a that stores the first code used for the second encryption communication. Therefore, when the smart ECU 13 is removed from the vehicle, the first code disappears from the memory 13a. Therefore, a third party cannot know the first code even if the smart ECU 13 is removed from the vehicle and analyzed. That is, the vehicle security device 11 can prevent the vehicle power and the smart ECU 13 from being removed and the content of the memory 13a from obtaining the first code by an illegal act such as analyzing the first code. Therefore, the vehicle security device 11 can prevent establishment of mutual authentication between the smart ECU 13 and the ID code box 14 due to fraud, and can further improve the security level of the vehicle. A third party cannot start the engine 16 even if the smart ECU 13 is removed from the vehicle and analyzed. Therefore, the smart ECU 13 can be installed at a place where it can be easily removed from the vehicle. Therefore, the smart ECU 13 can be arranged relatively freely.
- the smart ECU 13 generates a first code using a vehicle code used for the first encrypted communication and an arithmetic expression unique to the smart ECU 13. For this reason, even if a third party can analyze the vehicle code from the smart ECU 13, if it cannot analyze the arithmetic expression for generating the first code, the mutual authentication by the second encrypted communication is performed. It is impossible to establish It is. Generally, it is difficult for the vehicle power to remove the smart ECU 13 and analyze the arithmetic expression for generating the first code. Therefore, the vehicle security device 11 can further improve the security level of the vehicle.
- the arithmetic expression stored in the smart ECU 13 for generating the first code is different from the arithmetic expression of the other smart ECUs, so the first code generated by the other smart ECU is generated by the smart ECU 13 Is different from the first code. Therefore, when the existing smart ECU 13 is replaced with another smart ECU, the second encryption communication is not established. In other words, even if the smart ECU 13 is replaced by a third party who does not know the first code, the engine ECU 15 prohibits the start of the engine 16 without establishing the second encrypted communication. Therefore, the vehicle security device 11 can further improve the security level of the vehicle.
- the smart ECU 13 can be installed at a location where the vehicle power can be relatively easily removed, for example, below the driver's seat.
- the maintenance of the smart ECU 13 installed in such an easily removable location is easy. Therefore, the convenience of the vehicle security device 11 is improved.
- the ECU 15 permits the start of the engine 16 when mutual authentication is established in all of the first encrypted communication, the second encrypted communication, and the third encrypted communication. . That is, in order to allow the engine 16 to start, three mutual certifications must be established.
- the function of the smart ECU and the function of the immobilizer ECU in the conventional vehicle security device are integrated, there is no need for encrypted communication between the smart ECU and the immobilizer ECU. That is, only twice to allow the engine 16 to start Encrypted communication is performed.
- the second encrypted communication is performed between the smart ECU 13 and the ID code box 14, three encrypted communication are performed. Therefore, the vehicle security device 11 of one embodiment can perform a relatively large number of encrypted communications to improve the security level of the vehicle.
- the connection relationship between the components in the vehicle security device 11 is not limited to the connection relationship shown in FIG.
- the engine ECU 15 may be connected to the smart ECU 32 as in the vehicle security device 31 of the vehicle antitheft system 30 shown in FIG.
- the smart ECU 32 has a function of mutual authentication by the first encryption communication and a function of mutual authentication by the second encryption communication, and a third encryption performed between the engine ECU 15 and the ID code box 14.
- the smart ECU 32 includes a volatile memory 32a that functions as a storage unit.
- the smart ECU 32 supplies the signal received from the engine ECU 15 to the ID code box 14 via the memory 32a. Further, the smart ECU 32 supplies the signal received from the ID code box 14 to the engine ECU 15 via the memory 32a.
- the smart ECU 32 mediates mutual authentication by the third encryption communication. That is, the smart ECU 32 uses the memory 32a as a buffer to mediate mutual authentication by the third encryption communication.
- the vehicle security device 31 can prevent establishment of mutual authentication between the ID code box 14 and the engine ECU 15 due to fraud, and can maintain the security level of the vehicle. Therefore, it is possible to widen options of connection relations of each component in the vehicle security device while maintaining the security level of the vehicle.
- the ID code box 14 is connected only to the smart ECU 32, the ID code box 14 is not connected. The number of connectors in task 14 is reduced. Therefore, the ID code box 14 has a relatively simple configuration. Therefore, the ID code box 14 is made smaller in one layer, and it becomes easier to install the ID code box 14 in a place where it is difficult to remove the ID code box 14 from the vehicle.
- the smart ECU 13 generates a first code necessary for establishing the second encrypted communication by calculation from the vehicle code, and stores the generated first code in the nonvolatile memory 13a.
- the smart ECU 13 need not store the generated first code in the memory 13a. In this case, the smart ECU 13 generates the first code by calculation each time the second encryption communication is performed.
- the third encrypted communication is performed between the ID code box 14 and the engine ECU 15.
- the ECU that performs the third encrypted communication with the ID code box 14 is not limited to the engine ECU 15.
- a third encrypted communication may be performed between the ID code box 14 and the steering lock ECU, including a steering lock ECU connected to the vehicle security device ID code box 14.
- the steering lock ECU may release the steering lock when mutual authentication is established in all of the first encrypted communication, the second encrypted communication, and the third encrypted communication.
- Such a vehicle security device improves the security level of the vehicle by preventing the unlocking of the steering wheel due to an illegal act.
- the second communication means connected to the ID code box 14 may be any ECU having the authority to restrict the running of the vehicle.
- the function of the smart ECU and the function of the immobilizer ECU were integrated in the smart ECU 13.
- a smart ECU and an immobilizer ECU may be separately provided as in a conventional vehicle security device.
- the second encrypted communication is performed between the ID code box 14 and the smart ECU, and between the ID code box 14 and the immobilizer ECU.
- the second communication means is not limited to the engine ECU 15.
- the second communication means may be a door ECU that controls the raising and lowering of window glass.
- the door ECU performs the first encrypted communication, the second encrypted communication, and the third encrypted communication in all encrypted communications.
- V When mutual authentication is established, the raising or lowering of the window glass is permitted.
- the second communication means may be a CPU (ECU) for controlling the operation of the car audio. In this way, if mutual authentication is established in all of the first, second, and third encryption communication, the CUP permits the operation of the power window or the operation of the car audio. Therefore, unauthorized use of these vehicle devices by a third party can be prevented.
- the second communication means includes a shift lock CPU (ECU) for controlling to lock the shift lever to the non-traveling position (parking position or neutral position) or a tire lock CPU (ECU) for controlling to lock the tire. ).
- the shift lock CPU unlocks the shift lever and enables the vehicle to run when mutual authentication is established in all of the first, second, and third encryption communication.
- the tire lock CPU unlocks the tires and enables the vehicle to run when mutual authentication is established in all of the first, second, and third encryption communication. In this way, the vehicle cannot run if mutual authentication is not established in all of the first, second, and third encryption communication. Therefore, theft of the vehicle is prevented, and the security level of the vehicle is further improved.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Combined Controls Of Internal Combustion Engines (AREA)
Abstract
Description
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Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP20040799488 EP1602539B1 (en) | 2003-11-04 | 2004-11-04 | Vehicle security device and id code management device |
US10/542,282 US7327227B2 (en) | 2003-11-04 | 2004-11-04 | Vehicle security device and ID code management device |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2003-374654 | 2003-11-04 | ||
JP2003374654A JP4156493B2 (ja) | 2003-11-04 | 2003-11-04 | 車両用セキュリティ装置及びidコード管理装置 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2005042317A1 true WO2005042317A1 (ja) | 2005-05-12 |
Family
ID=34544217
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2004/016309 WO2005042317A1 (ja) | 2003-11-04 | 2004-11-04 | 車両セキュリティ装置及びidコード管理装置 |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7327227B2 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP1602539B1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4156493B2 (ja) |
KR (1) | KR100687915B1 (ja) |
CN (2) | CN100420596C (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2005042317A1 (ja) |
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US7667348B2 (en) * | 2006-03-31 | 2010-02-23 | Honda Motor Co., Ltd. | Vehicle theft prevention device |
CN103166943A (zh) * | 2011-12-19 | 2013-06-19 | 北汽福田汽车股份有限公司 | 一种对电子控制单元ecu目标文件加密传输的方法及系统 |
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US9571284B2 (en) * | 2014-03-13 | 2017-02-14 | GM Global Technology Operations LLC | Controlling access to personal information stored in a vehicle using a cryptographic key |
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Also Published As
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JP2005138633A (ja) | 2005-06-02 |
EP1602539A1 (en) | 2005-12-07 |
CN2787784Y (zh) | 2006-06-14 |
CN1723142A (zh) | 2006-01-18 |
JP4156493B2 (ja) | 2008-09-24 |
KR20060017484A (ko) | 2006-02-23 |
CN100420596C (zh) | 2008-09-24 |
US20060152348A1 (en) | 2006-07-13 |
EP1602539B1 (en) | 2011-06-29 |
US7327227B2 (en) | 2008-02-05 |
KR100687915B1 (ko) | 2007-02-27 |
EP1602539A4 (en) | 2009-05-06 |
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