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EP1061489B1 - Détecteur d'intrusion avec dispositif de surveillance contre un sabotage - Google Patents

Détecteur d'intrusion avec dispositif de surveillance contre un sabotage Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1061489B1
EP1061489B1 EP99110848A EP99110848A EP1061489B1 EP 1061489 B1 EP1061489 B1 EP 1061489B1 EP 99110848 A EP99110848 A EP 99110848A EP 99110848 A EP99110848 A EP 99110848A EP 1061489 B1 EP1061489 B1 EP 1061489B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
infrared
detector
receiver
radiation
transmitter
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP99110848A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1061489A1 (fr
Inventor
David Siegwart
Peter Stierli
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Building Technologies AG
Original Assignee
Siemens Building Technologies AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Building Technologies AG filed Critical Siemens Building Technologies AG
Priority to DE59910349T priority Critical patent/DE59910349D1/de
Priority to EP99110848A priority patent/EP1061489B1/fr
Priority to AT99110848T priority patent/ATE274735T1/de
Priority to IL13586900A priority patent/IL135869A/xx
Priority to US09/587,812 priority patent/US6377174B1/en
Publication of EP1061489A1 publication Critical patent/EP1061489A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1061489B1 publication Critical patent/EP1061489B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B29/00—Checking or monitoring of signalling or alarm systems; Prevention or correction of operating errors, e.g. preventing unauthorised operation
    • G08B29/18—Prevention or correction of operating errors
    • G08B29/183—Single detectors using dual technologies
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/16—Actuation by interference with mechanical vibrations in air or other fluid
    • G08B13/1609—Actuation by interference with mechanical vibrations in air or other fluid using active vibration detection systems
    • G08B13/1645—Actuation by interference with mechanical vibrations in air or other fluid using active vibration detection systems using ultrasonic detection means and other detection means, e.g. microwave or infrared radiation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/18—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength
    • G08B13/181—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using active radiation detection systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/18—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength
    • G08B13/189—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems
    • G08B13/19—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems using infrared-radiation detection systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B29/00—Checking or monitoring of signalling or alarm systems; Prevention or correction of operating errors, e.g. preventing unauthorised operation
    • G08B29/02—Monitoring continuously signalling or alarm systems
    • G08B29/04—Monitoring of the detection circuits
    • G08B29/046—Monitoring of the detection circuits prevention of tampering with detection circuits

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an intrusion detector with and in a housing arranged infrared part, with an infrared sensor, one provided in the housing wall Detector window for the passage of infrared radiation from the outside to the infrared sensor, a means for bundling the infrared radiation incident through the detector window the infrared sensor and with one comprising an infrared transmitter and an infrared receiver Sabotage monitoring device, whereby the infrared seuder and the infrared receiver within the Housing are attached.
  • Such devices for sabotage monitoring also known as anti-mask devices, as for example in EP-A-0 186 226, in EP-A-0 499 177 and in EP-A-0 556 898 are used to identify the two types of cover for the detector, that is the coverage of the detector in a certain, possibly only slight, Distance from the detector window, and the immediate coverage of the detector window by, for example Covering with a film or spraying with an infrared-opaque spray, such as paint spray.
  • the first type of coverage is subsequently referred to as remote coverage and the second is called a spray cover, with remote cover being a cover at a distance of a few millimeters up to a maximum of about 15 cm from the detector window.
  • the known devices for sabotage monitoring are single or two-channel systems built up.
  • two-channel systems such as that described in EP-A-0 186 226 Device, sends a first infrared transmitter, which is arranged inside the detector, Infrared radiation in the monitoring room in front of the detector and a first receiver measures the radiation reflected from the surveillance room.
  • a second one on the outside of the detector arranged infrared transmitter sends radiation through the detector window to a second Receiver that measures the incident radiation from the second transmitter.
  • the first broadcaster and the first receiver form a channel for monitoring attempts at sabotage in the manner of of remote coverage and the second transmitter and the second receiver form a channel for Monitoring of sabotage attempts in the manner of spray coverage.
  • the device for sabotage monitoring contains only one infrared transmitter and only one infrared receiver, the transmitter is arranged on the outside and the receiver inside the detector. The transmitter sends infrared radiation on the one hand into the monitoring room in front of the detector and on the other hand through the detector window onto the receiver.
  • a similar single-channel system is in EP-A-0 556 898.
  • the detector window to line up with the Time discolors and possibly also its transmission properties for infrared radiation changes.
  • the latter can be a technical impairment to the functionality of the detector Be a disadvantage; in any case, the discoloration of the detector window is aesthetic Disadvantage because over time the detector window differs from the detector housing Color assumes.
  • the diffraction-optical grating structure is only for detection suitable from spray cover, but not from remote cover.
  • the invention now aims to provide an intrusion detector with a device for tamper monitoring be specified, which neither the creative freedom for the training of the Detector housing constricts, still impairing functional reliability or the exterior Appearance of a detector equipped with such a device. Furthermore should both types of sabotage, namely the remote cover and the spray cover, can be recognized in so-called real-time mode if possible.
  • Real-time mode is a process in which only sufficiently large and sufficient stable changes trigger a sabotage alarm which, when the signals return to the Normal state is automatically withdrawn.
  • This mode reacts slower than the second known method, the so-called proximity latch mode, has the advantage automatic alarm cancellation.
  • the solution according to the invention is characterized in that that the detector window for the radiation emitted by the infrared transmitter is permeable, and that monitoring sabotage of the detector by measuring the from the inside of the detector window and the the surrounding space to the infrared receiver reflected portion of said radiation he follows.
  • the arrangement of the transmitter and receiver under the detector window is not only aesthetic Viewpoints and avoiding the risk of excessive and difficult to remove Particle deposits on the detector window have the further advantage that not from the outside it can be seen that the detector has a device for monitoring sabotage.
  • dark material means a material that is below one Well absorbed wavelength of about 4 ⁇ m.
  • the reflective layer is in the visible range transparent and allows infrared radiation of short wavelengths, preferably below 4 - 7 ⁇ m through so that it can get into the dark carrier layer, where it is absorbed.
  • the mirror made of dark material ensures that as little interference light as possible on the sensor and falls on the infrared receiver, and is therefore a prerequisite that the detector has both types of sabotage, Remote coverage and spray coverage, can detect in real-time mode.
  • a third preferred embodiment of the intrusion detector according to the invention is thereby characterized in that the detector consists of an additional transmitter and an additional Receiver existing additional part that an evaluation of the signal of the additional Receiver takes place in two frequency ranges, one of which for movements in the Surveillance room and the other is characteristic of a cover of the detector, and that a common evaluation circuit is provided for the additional part and the infrared part is.
  • the additional part is preferably an ultrasonic part with one ultrasonic transmitter and one Ultrasonic receiver or a microwave part with a microwave transmitter and a microwave receiver.
  • a further preferred embodiment of the intrusion detector according to the invention is thereby characterized in that evaluation circuit downstream of the infrared sensor PIR channel, an anti-mask channel downstream of the infrared receiver and one second receiver downstream US channel with US antimask channel and one to the outputs of the above-mentioned channels connected logic level for the combined evaluation which has signals from these channels.
  • Fig. 1 shows a longitudinal section through an intrusion detector according to the invention in the direction perpendicular to its rear wall or floor, the floor being removed
  • FIG. 2 shows a partial view from behind, the mirror for bundling the incident Infrared radiation is removed from the detector.
  • the intrusion detector shown is a so-called Dual detector, which consists of the combination of a passive infrared detector and one with there is an ultrasound detector connected via an intelligent link.
  • the infrared part reacts to the body radiation of a person in the infrared spectral range and Ultrasound part on the frequency shift of the caused by the Doppler effect a moving intruder reflected ultrasound.
  • the intrusion detector can sabotage only one of the detectors.
  • a Such sabotage usually takes place on the infrared detector in the form of the introduction to the description mentioned types of coverage remote coverage or spray coverage because of decommissioning of the ultrasound part of the whole detector would have to be covered, which is immediately recognizable would.
  • the device used in the intrusion detector described below Sabotage monitoring also serves to detect sabotage on the infrared detector and can therefore not only be used in conjunction with dual detectors but also with passive infrared detectors may be used, in which case minor adaptations may be required can.
  • the intrusion detector consists of a two-part housing with a base (not shown) and cover 1, a detector window 2 provided in the cover 1 for the Passage of the infrared radiation falling from the room to be monitored onto the detector Detector interior, a circuit board 3 arranged in the interior of the detector, on which, among other things, a Infrared sensor 4, an ultrasound transmitter 5, an ultrasound receiver 6 and an evaluation circuit 7 are arranged, and with a mirror 8 also arranged in the interior of the detector Focusing of the infrared radiation incident through the detector window 2 onto the infrared sensor 4.
  • a pin element 9 of an electrical connector arranged, the socket element is located in the housing base. When closing the Housing pin element 9 is inserted into the socket element, whereby the electrical Contact with the power supply and any data lines is established.
  • the entrance window 2 consists for example of polyethylene or polypropylene and is for Radiation in the wavelength range of approximately 5 to 15 ⁇ m and in the range of approximately 0.9 ⁇ m permeable.
  • the mirror 8 is designed such that it absorbs radiation in the near infrared and Reflected body radiation.
  • a mirror with a day layer is particularly suitable for this made of dark material and a reflective layer applied on it, which for interference radiation below the wavelength range mentioned is transparent and radiation from this wavelength range strongly reflected.
  • EP-A-0 303 913 referenced and with regard to the mirror material to EP-A-0 707 294.
  • the entrance window 2 can be designed as a Fresnel lens and instead of the mirror 8, the infrared radiation on the Focus infrared sensor 4.
  • the ultrasound transmitter 5 emits ultrasound at a frequency of over 20 kHz through an opening 10 in the housing cover 1 in the monitoring room in front of the detector, and the ultrasonic receiver 6 takes the reflected from the surveillance room and through a window 11 in the housing cover 1 on the receiver 6 ultrasound and leads the evaluation circuit 7 a corresponding signal. While stationary objects only use ultrasound reflecting the transmission frequency, a moving object causes a frequency shift after the Doppler effect.
  • the evaluation circuit 7 triggers an alarm signal when this Frequency shift corresponds to the values typical for a moving person and if at the same time the infrared sensor 4 is infrared radiation typical of a human being receives.
  • the intrusion detector shown is with a so-called anti-mask device for detection of processes or optical changes immediately in front of the detector (so-called remote coverage) and changes in the optical properties of the entrance window 2, in particular equipped by its spraying (so-called spray cover).
  • Such masking is used to manipulate the detector so that no infrared radiation can reach the infrared sensor so that unauthorized persons can no longer be detected and can move freely in the monitored room.
  • Masking or sabotage will mostly perpetrated during the disarming of the detector when it is in a stand-by mode is switched on and people in the monitored room do not trigger an alarm.
  • the detector should be able to automatically detect such masking, specifically preferably at the time of masking or at the latest when the detector is armed or the plant.
  • the device for sabotage monitoring is designed so that with a single channel both masking methods can be reliably recognized.
  • an infrared transmitter 12 is arranged on both sides of the infrared sensor 4 and symmetrically to the latter.
  • IRED infrared LED
  • the infrared receiver 13 is preferably formed by a so-called Pn diode.
  • the signal of the infrared receiver 13 with an alarm threshold and preferably also compared to several pre-alarm thresholds or in the case of an evaluation examined with the help of fuzzy logic according to the corresponding fuzzy rules. If below Threshold or reference values are mentioned, so they are always the same Fuzzy rules meant.
  • the evaluation takes place in real-time mode, which is stable over time longer violations of the relevant threshold or reference values respond. A masking alarm is only triggered if the excess is long enough. Furthermore the masking alarm is automatically reset as soon as the detector returns to its normal state returns; intervention by an operator is not for resetting required.
  • the infrared receiver 13 always receives a specific one in the normal operating state of the detector Proportion of the radiation emitted by the infrared transmitters 12, part of which is transmitted through the detector window 2 comes out and another part of the detector window 2 on the infrared receiver 13 is reflected. So you can, as long as the signal of the infrared receiver 13 within of a certain band range, we can safely assume that the detector is not masked.
  • the Pn diode forming the infrared receiver 13 has a non-linear characteristic, and since the detector window 2 because of the arrangement of the device for sabotage monitoring inside the detector has to be transparent to a certain extent, that has to be extraneous light reaching the infrared receiver 13 can be compensated. To this end the incident external light is measured and the signal of the infrared receiver 13 is corresponding corrected.
  • Another correction is due to the temperature dependence of the optical power of the infrared transmitter 12 required. This correction is done by changing the temperature either the electrical current through the infrared transmitter 12 is adjusted via the characteristic curve in this way is that the intensity of the specified infrared radiation remains constant, or it is in the Infrared receiver 13 is the signal component originating from the infrared transmitter 12 with a temperature-dependent one optical power of the infrared transmitter 12 compensating correction factor multiplied.
  • the signal of the infrared receiver 13 falls below a predetermined minimum value, does this mean that the radiation received by the infrared receiver 13 has decreased, and this is an indication of a spray cover of the detector window 2, which is sprayed in the State reflects the radiation of the infrared transmitter 12 less strongly than in the normal state. If the signal from the infrared receiver exceeds a predetermined maximum value, means that either from the outside a larger proportion of that from the infrared transmitters 12 emitted radiation is reflected (remote coverage), or that the detector window more reflective than in normal condition (spray cover with bright color spray).
  • the evaluation circuit 7 contains one connected to the infrared sensor 4 PIR channel 14, an anti-mask channel connected to the infrared receiver 13 15, a US channel 16 connected to the ultrasound receiver 5 with a US antimask channel 17 and a logic stage 18.
  • the outputs of the four channels mentioned are led to the linkage stage 18, in which a combined evaluation of the signals of the individual channels.
  • the result of this combined evaluation forms the basis for the decision for the alarm to be given by the detector, this is an intrusion alarm or a masking alarm.
  • the combined evaluation of the PIR channel 7 and the US channel 16 essentially exists in that the detector emits an intrusion alarm when the signal is in the US channel 16 a predetermined, dependent on the speed of movement of an object, Frequency shift compared to the transmission frequency shows, and at the same time the IR channel 14 receives infrared radiation typical of the presence of a person.
  • the evaluated Doppler frequency range is 25.6 kHz ⁇ 500 Hz, since with not extremely fast movements, what a burglar can assume is a signal in this frequency range is produced.
  • the Antimask channel 15 and the US channel 16 there is only a relatively loose link between the antimask channel 15 and the US channel 16 such that both of these channels have certain types of coverage can recognize, so that the two channels complement each other in a very effective way.
  • the signal of the infrared receiver 13 is observed DC, or in other words, deviations of the signal from its rest value are examined. This is necessary for real-time mode because this is the only way the detector can return to its normal operating condition, i.e. the removal of the cover, can be recognized. Since the If the signal has to be processed digitally, there is an A / D conversion of the signal of the infrared receiver 13 through a high-resolution A / D converter.
  • the great dynamics of the A / D converter is necessary because it covers the rest area of the signal and must recognize very small deviations from this, but the resting value because of the Manufacturing tolerances and the spread of the electro-optical efficiency of the optical Components is subject to strong scattering.
  • the ultrasound part therefore protects itself against covers.
  • he supports the infrared part when detecting remote coverage with materials that are for the infrared part only are difficult to see, such as transparent or black in the infrared range Items.
  • the antimask channel 15 recognizes bright, acoustically soft materials very good and thereby supports the anti-mask function of the ultrasound part. If the Infrared and the ultrasound part would be more closely nested, for example by Arrangement of ultrasound transmitter 6 and ultrasound receiver 5 on different sides of the Detector window 2 (left and right, top and bottom or diagonally opposite), could the signals of channels 15 and 16 are more closely linked.
  • the ultrasound part consisting of the ultrasound transmitter 5 and the ultrasound receiver 6 can also be provided by one consisting of a microwave transmitter and a microwave receiver Microwave part to be replaced, with certain circuitry familiar to those skilled in the art Adjustments are required.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Toxicology (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)

Claims (11)

  1. Détecteur d'intrusion comprenant un boítier (1) et une partie infrarouge qui y est placée, un capteur (4) d'infrarouges, une fenêtre (2) de détecteur prévue dans la paroi du boítier pour le passage du rayonnement infrarouge de l'espace extérieur au capteur (4) d'infrarouges, un moyen de focalisation sur le capteur (4) d'infrarouges du rayonnement infrarouge arrivant sur la fenêtre (2) du détecteur et un dispositif comprenant un émetteur (12) d'infrarouges et un récepteur (13) d'infrarouges et destiné à la surveillance vis-à-vis d'un sabotage, l'émetteur (12) d'infrarouges et le récepteur (13) d'infrarouges étant placés à l'intérieur du boítier (1), caractérisé en ce que la fenêtre (2) du détecteur est transparente au rayonnement émis par l'émetteur (12) d'infrarouges et en ce que la surveillance vis-à-vis du sabotage du détecteur s'effectue en mesurant la proportion dudit rayonnement réfléchie par la face intérieure de la fenêtre (2) du détecteur et la proportion dudit rayonnement réfléchie de l'espace extérieur au récepteur (13) d'infrarouges.
  2. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce qu'à l'émetteur (12) d'infrarouges et/ou récepteur (13) d'infrarouges sont associés des moyens de compensation de la lumière extérieure arrivant sur la fenêtre (2) du détecteur.
  3. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce qu'il est prévu des moyens de compensation de la variation en fonction de la température de la puissance optique de l'émetteur (12) d'infrarouges.
  4. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que les moyens de focalisation du rayonnement infrarouge passant la fenêtre (2) du détecteur sont formés par un miroir (8) ayant une couche support en un matériau sombre et une couche de réflexion qui y est appliquée, la couche de réflexion étant transparente d'une part au rayonnement parasite en dessous du domaine de longueur d'onde du rayonnement calorifique humain et réfléchissant d'autre part intensément du rayonnement dudit domaine de longueur d'onde.
  5. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 4, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif de surveillance vis-à-vis du sabotage a deux émetteurs (12) d'infrarouges inclinés par rapport à la face intérieure de la fenêtre (2) du détecteur et en ce que le récepteur (13) d'infrarouges est interposé entre les deux émetteurs (12) d'infrarouges.
  6. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 5, caractérisé en ce que le détecteur a une partie supplémentaire constituée d'un émetteur (5) supplémentaire et d'un récepteur (6) supplémentaire, en ce qu'une interprétation du signal du récepteur (6) supplémentaire s'effectue dans deux domaines de fréquence dont l'un est caractéristique de mouvements dans l'espace à surveiller et l'autre est caractéristique d'un recouvrement du détecteur et en ce qu'il est prévu pour la partie supplémentaire et la partie infrarouge un circuit (7) commun d'interprétation.
  7. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant la revendication 6, caractérisé en ce que l'émetteur (5) supplémentaire et le récepteur (6) supplémentaire sont disposés à proximité du bord de la fenêtre (2) du détecteur.
  8. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant la revendication 6 ou 7, caractérisé en ce que le circuit (7) d'exploitation a un canal (14) PIR monté en aval du capteur (4) d'infrarouges, un canal (15) antimasque monté en aval du récepteur (13) d'infrarouges et un canal (16) US monté en aval du récepteur (6) supplémentaire et ayant un canal (17) US-antimasque, ainsi qu'un étage (18) de combinaison logique raccordé aux sorties desdits canaux et destiné à interpréter la combinaison des signaux de ces canaux.
  9. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant la revendication 8, caractérisé en ce que pour interpréter ladite combinaison la partie supplémentaire assiste le dispositif de surveillance vis-à-vis d'un sabotage lors de la reconnaissante de matériaux pouvant être difficilement reconnus par le rayonnement infrarouge et le dispositif de surveillance vis-à-vis du sabotage assiste la partie supplémentaire lors de la reconnaissance de matériaux qui ne peuvent être reconnus que difficilement par celle-ci.
  10. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant l'une des revendications 6 à 9, caractérisé en ce que la partie supplémentaire est formée par une partie à ultrasons comportant un émetteur (5) d'ultrasons et un récepteur (6) d'ultrasons ou par une partie micro-onde comportant un émetteur de micro-ondes et un récepteur de micro-ondes.
  11. Détecteur d'intrusion suivant la revendication 10, caractérisé en ce que le canal (15) antimasque comporte un convertisseur analogique/numérique à haute résolution pour la numérisation du signal du récepteur (13) infrarouge.
EP99110848A 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Détecteur d'intrusion avec dispositif de surveillance contre un sabotage Expired - Lifetime EP1061489B1 (fr)

Priority Applications (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE59910349T DE59910349D1 (de) 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Intrusionsmelder mit einer Einrichtung zur Sabotageüberwachung
EP99110848A EP1061489B1 (fr) 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Détecteur d'intrusion avec dispositif de surveillance contre un sabotage
AT99110848T ATE274735T1 (de) 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Intrusionsmelder mit einer einrichtung zur sabotageüberwachung
IL13586900A IL135869A (en) 1999-06-07 2000-04-28 Intrusion detector having a sabotage surveillance device
US09/587,812 US6377174B1 (en) 1999-06-07 2000-06-06 Intrusion detector having a sabotage surveillance device

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP99110848A EP1061489B1 (fr) 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Détecteur d'intrusion avec dispositif de surveillance contre un sabotage
US09/587,812 US6377174B1 (en) 1999-06-07 2000-06-06 Intrusion detector having a sabotage surveillance device

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1061489A1 EP1061489A1 (fr) 2000-12-20
EP1061489B1 true EP1061489B1 (fr) 2004-08-25

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EP99110848A Expired - Lifetime EP1061489B1 (fr) 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Détecteur d'intrusion avec dispositif de surveillance contre un sabotage

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US (1) US6377174B1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1061489B1 (fr)

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US11403923B2 (en) 2020-12-09 2022-08-02 Ademco Inc. Selectively enabled tamper detection
EP4174814A1 (fr) * 2021-10-26 2023-05-03 Carrier Fire & Security EMEA BV Détecteur de mouvement avec détection de masquage

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