Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting
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- Lee, Gea M., 2010. "Optimal collusion with internal contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 646-669, March.
- Gea M. Lee, 2008. "Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting," Development Economics Working Papers 22466, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
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Cited by:
- Lee, Gea M., 2010.
"Optimal collusion with internal contracting,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 646-669, March.
- Gea M. Lee, 2008. "Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting," Development Economics Working Papers 22466, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Gea Myoung Lee, 2008. "Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting," Working Papers 08-2008, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Fabian Herweg & Antonio Rosato, 2020. "Bait and ditch: Consumer naïveté and salesforce incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 97-121, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
Optimal collusion; internal contract; privately-informed agents; price-fixing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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