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Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists

Author

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  • Lipatov, Vilen
Abstract
Economists agree that accounting specialists are helpful in avoiding taxes. We argue that such help can often be called sophisticated evasion. We analyze it in a game of incomplete information played by tax authority, corporate taxpayers and accounting specialist. When sophisticated evasion is very common, marginal changes in enforcement are not effective, so radical measures are needed for improving compliance. Fines on firms as opposed to specialist are more effective in facilitating such measures. When the evasion is modest, auditing and accounting costs as opposed to fines are more effective in curbing it.

Suggested Citation

  • Lipatov, Vilen, 2005. "Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists," MPRA Paper 14181, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2009.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14181
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Katherine Cuff & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2016. "Dual Corporate Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers dp16-12, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    2. Rainer Niemann & Mariana Sailer, 2023. "Is analytical tax research alive and kicking? Insights from 2000 until 2022," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 93(6), pages 1149-1212, August.
    3. Grottke, Markus & Lorenz, Johannes, 2017. "Tax consultants' incentives: A game-theoretic investigation into the behavior of tax consultants, taxpayers, and the tax authority in a setting of tax complexity," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe B-30-17, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    4. Gilbert Mbaraa & Ryszard Kokoszczyński, 2018. "Corporate governance, tax evasion and business cycles," Working Papers 2018-10, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    5. Vilen Lipatov, 2014. "Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series 4767, CESifo.
    6. Marchese, Carla & Venturini, Andrea, 2017. "Is there any Induced Demand for Tax Evasion?," IEL Working Papers 22, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    7. Rongili Biswas & Carla Marchese & Fabio Privileggi, 2013. "Firm’s tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 110(2), pages 125-140, October.
    8. Oliver Nnamdi Okafor, 2023. "Shaming of Tax Evaders: Empirical Evidence on Perceptions of Retributive Justice and Tax Compliance Intentions," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 182(2), pages 377-395, January.
    9. Lipatov, Vilen, 2006. "Tax Evasion and Coordination," MPRA Paper 1251, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2006.
    10. Imes, Amanda J. Thoe, 2013. "An examination of the sales and use tax gap based on Minnesota audit experience," Master's Theses and Plan B Papers 157013, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    11. Carlo Fiorio & Stefano Iacus & Alessandro Santoro, 2013. "Taxpaying response of small firms to an increased probability of audit: some evidence from Italy," Working Papers 251, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2013.
    12. Antonetti, Paolo & Anesa, Mattia, 2017. "Consumer reactions to corporate tax strategies: The role of political ideology," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-10.
    13. Katherine Cuff & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2017. "Shades of Grey: Business Compliance with Fiscal and Labour Regulations," Discussion Papers dp17-07, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    14. Thomas A. Gresik & Kai A. Konrad, 2017. "Tax Havens, Accounting Experts, and Fee-Setting Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series 6774, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax evasion; tax avoidance; sophisticated evasion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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