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Medicracy, Second Version

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Mattozzi

    (Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology)

  • Antonio Merlo

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract
We study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could afford to recruit better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional electoral systems than in majoritarian electoral systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "Medicracy, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 10-017, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Apr 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:10-017
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Politicians; Parties; Political Recruitment; Electoral Systems; All-pay Auctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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