On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints, Third Version
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References listed on IDEAS
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21.
- Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020.
"First-price auctions with budget constraints,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
- Kotowski, Maciej, 2019. "First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series rwp19-021, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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Cited by:
- Bobkova, Nina, 2020.
"Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
- Bobkova, Nina, 2017. "Asymmetric Budget Constraints in a First Price Auction," MPRA Paper 88628, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Aug 2018.
- Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020.
"First-price auctions with budget constraints,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
- Kotowski, Maciej, 2019. "First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series rwp19-021, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.
- Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2019. "Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 611-632.
- Ulrich Bergmann & Arkady Konovalov, 2024. "Auction design and order of sale with budget-constrained bidders," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(1), pages 36-57, March.
- Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014.
"The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 420-423.
- Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Li, Fei, 2014. "The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information," Scholarly Articles 12559696, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Baisa, Brian & Rabinovich, Stanislav, 2016. "Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 162-165.
- Jianfu Shen & Frederik Pretorius & K. W. Chau, 2018. "Land Auctions with Budget Constraints," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 443-471, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
All-Pay Auction; War of Attrition; Budget Constraints; Common Values; Private Values; Affiliation; Contests;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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