[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pcc/pccumd/11accw.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Comparison of Auction Formats for Auctioning Wind Rights

Author

Abstract
The best sites for offshore wind farms on the US Outer Continental Shelf are scarce. To make the best use of this scarce resource, it is necessary to implement a fair and efficient mechanism to assign leases to companies that are most likely to develop off-shore wind energy projects. Coastal states, particularly along the eastern seaboard, are taking aggressive actions to spur the growth of an offshore wind sector in their states to help meet their renewable portfolio targets while nurturing the supporting on-shore infrastructure. This paper compares the various auction formats described in “Auction Design for Wind Rights” (Ausubel and Cramton 2011a), and the multiple factor considerations documented in “Multiple Factor Auction Design for Wind Rights” (Ausubel and Cramton 2011b). The paper describes in further detail four different clock auction designs for auctioning these alternative energy leases and highlights considerations that should be factored into the auction rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2012. "Comparison of Auction Formats for Auctioning Wind Rights," Papers of Peter Cramton 11accw, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11accw
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-2014/ausubel-cramton-auction-design-for-wind-rights-paper3.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; clock auctions; spectrum auctions; market design; wind rights auctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11accw. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Cramton (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cramton.umd.edu .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.