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The Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending: A Meta-Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Alptekin, Huzeyfe
  • Freire, Danilo

    (Brown University)

  • Mignozzetti, Umberto Guarnier

    (Fundação Getulio Vargas)

  • Roman, Catarina
Abstract
In a seminal article, Weingast et al. (1981) argue that there is a positive relationship between legislature size and inefficiency in public expenditures. Their proposition is currently known as the "law of _1/n_" and has been widely cited by scholars in political science and public administration. However, recent studies have questioned the validity of the theory. In this paper, we estimate the first meta-analysis of the relationship between the number of legislators and public spending. Based on a sample of 26 empirical studies, we find little effect of legislature size on government budgets. The available evidence suggests that, if such an effect exists, it is driven by an increase in the upper chamber, but there is considerable heterogeneity in the results. Our meta-regressions also indicate that study coefficients vary significantly according to modelling specifications, such as estimation method or variable selection.

Suggested Citation

  • Alptekin, Huzeyfe & Freire, Danilo & Mignozzetti, Umberto Guarnier & Roman, Catarina, 2020. "The Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending: A Meta-Analysis," SocArXiv xf7wp, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:xf7wp
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/xf7wp
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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