After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies
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- Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2004. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 753-763, June.
- Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2934, The World Bank.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-POL-2002-10-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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