Left Behind By Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability
Author
Suggested Citation
Note: CH ED LS
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Derek Neal & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010. "Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 263-283, May.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jacob, Brian A., 2005. "Accountability, incentives and behavior: the impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 761-796, June.
- Becker, William E. & Rosen, Sherwin, 1992.
"The learning effect of assessment and evaluation in high school,"
Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 107-118, June.
- Becker, W. & Rosen, S., 1990. "The Learning Effect Of Assessment And Evaluation In High School," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-7, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
- Daniel M. Koretz, 2002. "Limitations in the Use of Achievement Tests as Measures of Educators' Productivity," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 752-777.
- Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, 2005.
"Does school accountability lead to improved student performance?,"
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(2), pages 297-327.
- Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, 2004. "Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student Performance?," NBER Working Papers 10591, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Helen Slater & Deborah Wilson, 2005.
"Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools,"
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation
05/128, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Wilson, Deborah & Slater, Helen, 2005. "Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools," CEPR Discussion Papers 5248, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Edward P. Lazear, 2006. "Speeding, Terrorism, and Teaching to the Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(3), pages 1029-1061.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Derek Neal, 2011. "The Design of Performance Pay in Education," NBER Working Papers 16710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2012.
"Pay for Percentile,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1805-1831, August.
- Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2009. "Pay for percentile," Working Paper Series WP-09-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Barlevy, Gadi & Neal, Derek, 2009. "Pay for Percentile," IZA Discussion Papers 4383, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2011. "Pay for Percentile," NBER Working Papers 17194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Leschnig, Lisa & Schwerdt, Guido & Zigova, Katarina, 2022.
"Central exams and adult skills: Evidence from PIAAC,"
Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
- Leschnig, Lisa & Schwerdt, Guido & Zigova, Katarina, 2021. "Central Exams and Adult Skills: Evidence from PIAAC," IZA Discussion Papers 14107, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Leschnig, Lisa & Schwerdt, Guido & Zigova, Katarina, 2021. "Central Exams and Adult Skills: Evidence from PIAAC," IAB-Discussion Paper 202106, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
- Lisa Leschnig & Guido Schwerdt & Katarina Zigova, 2021. "Central Exams and Adult Skills: Evidence from PIAAC," CESifo Working Paper Series 8899, CESifo.
- Lisa Leschnig & Guido Schwerdt & Katarina Zigova, 2022. "Central Exams and Adult Skills: Evidence from PIAAC," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0199, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).
- Leschnig, Lisa & Schwerdt, Guido & Zigova, Katarina, 2021. "Central exams and adult skills: Evidence from PIAAC," ROA Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
- Jalava, Nina & Joensen, Juanna Schrøter & Pellas, Elin, 2015.
"Grades and rank: Impacts of non-financial incentives on test performance,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 161-196.
- Jalava, Nina & Joensen, Juanna Schrøter & Pellas, Elin, 2014. "Grades and Rank: Impacts of Non-Financial Incentives on Test Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 8412, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Bokhari, Farasat A.S. & Schneider, Helen, 2011.
"School accountability laws and the consumption of psychostimulants,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 355-372, March.
- Farasat A.S. Bokhari & Helen Schnedier, 2009. "School accountability laws and the consumption of psychostimulants," Working Papers wp2009_03_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University, revised 08 Mar 2009.
- Erwin Ooghe & Erik Schokkaert, 2016.
"School accountability: can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection?,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 359-387, February.
- Ooghe, Erwin & Schokkaert, Erik, 2013. "School Accountability: Can We Reward Schools and Avoid Pupil Selection?," IZA Discussion Papers 7420, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Erwin OOGHE & Erik SCHOKKAERT, 2016. "School accountability: can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection?," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2799, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Karthik Muralidharan & Venkatesh Sundararaman, 2011.
"Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 39-77.
- Karthik Muralidharan & Venkatesh Sundararaman, 2009. "Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India," NBER Working Papers 15323, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Christian Jaag, 2005. "Hidden Teacher Effort in Educational Production: Monitoring vs. Merit Pay," HEW 0503003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Richardson, J.T., 2015. "Accountability incentives and academic achievement: Distributional impacts of accountability when standards are set low," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-16.
- Mullins, Jamie T., 2018. "Motivating emissions cleanup: Absolute vs. relative performance standards," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 66-92.
- Derek Neal, 2013. "The Consequences of Using One Assessment System To Pursue Two Objectives," NBER Working Papers 19214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Piopiunik, Marc & Schwerdt, Guido & Woessmann, Ludger, 2013.
"Central school exit exams and labor-market outcomes,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 93-108.
- Piopiunik, Marc & Schwerdt, Guido & Woessmann, Ludger, 2012. "Central School Exit Exams and Labor-Market Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 6889, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Marc Piopiunik & Guido Schwerdt & Ludger Woessmann, 2012. "Central School Exit Exams and Labor-Market Outcomes," CESifo Working Paper Series 3940, CESifo.
- Piopiunik, Marc & Schwerdt, Guido & Wößmann, Ludger, 2013. "Central school exit exams and labor-market outcomes," Munich Reprints in Economics 19325, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Seth Gershenson, 2016.
"Performance Standards and Employee Effort: Evidence From Teacher Absences,"
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(3), pages 615-638, June.
- Seth Gershenson, 2015. "Performance Standards and Employee Effort: Evidence from Teacher Absences," Upjohn Working Papers 15-217, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- Gershenson, Seth, 2015. "Performance Standards and Employee Effort: Evidence from Teacher Absences," IZA Discussion Papers 9203, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Bauer, Thomas K. & Grave, Barbara S., 2011.
"Performance-related Funding of Universities: Does More Competition Lead to Grade Inflation?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6073, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Bauer, Thomas K. & Grave, Barbara S., 2011. "Performance-related Funding of Universities – Does more Competition Lead to Grade Inflation?," Ruhr Economic Papers 288, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Michael Kuhn & Luigi Siciliani, 2009. "Performance Indicators for Quality with Costly Falsification," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(4), pages 1137-1154, December.
- Jones, Michael D., 2013.
"Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives,"
Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 148-164.
- Jones, Michael D., 2012. "Teacher Behavior under Performance Pay Incentives," MPRA Paper 43892, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2007.
"Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers: Evidence from a Firm-Level Experiment,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 729-773.
- Orana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2006. "Incentives for managers and inequality among workers: Evidence from a firm level experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00213, The Field Experiments Website.
- Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5649, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2062, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Burgard, Claudia & Grave, Barbara S., 2013. "Does it Pay Off to Incentivize Universities? – Performance Funding in the German Higher Education System," Ruhr Economic Papers 457, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Czibor, Eszter & Onderstal, Sander & Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, C. Mirjam, 2020.
"Does relative grading help male students? Evidence from a field experiment in the classroom,"
Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
- Czibor, Eszter & Onderstal, Sander & Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, Mirjam C., 2014. "Does Relative Grading Help Male Students? Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Classroom," IZA Discussion Papers 8429, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Eszter Czibor & Sander Onderstal & Randolph Sloof & Mirjam van Praag, 2016. "Does Relative Grading Help Male Students? Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Classroom," Framed Field Experiments 00548, The Field Experiments Website.
- Eszter Czibor & Sander Onderstal & Randolph Sloof & Mirjam van Praag, 2014. "Does Relative Grading help Male Students? Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Classroom," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-116/V, Tinbergen Institute.
- Jon Marius Vaag Iversen & Hans Bonesr�nning, 2013. "Disadvantaged students in the early grades: will smaller classes help them?," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 305-324, September.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-URE-2007-08-14 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13293. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.