[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lvl/laeccr/0205.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Maximal Decompositions of Cost Games into Specific and Joint Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Moreaux, Michel
  • Truchon, Michel
Abstract
The problem in which some agents joint together to realize a set of projects and must decide how to share its cost may be seen as a cooperative cost game. In many instances, total cost may naturally be decomposed into joint costs and costs that are specific to individual agents. We show that the maximal amount that can be attributed directly to each agent while yielding a problem for the joint cost that remains a cost game, is given by the minimal incremental cost of adding this agent to any of the possible coalitions of other agents. Thus, for concave games, it is given by the incremental cost of adding the agent to all others. We also show that a concave game yields a reduced game that is itself concave. Le problème où plusieurs agents entreprennent en commun un ensemble de projets et doivent décider du partage du coût total peut être vu comme un jeu coopératif. Dans certains cas, le coût total peut naturellement être décomposé en coûts joints et coûts spécifiques aux agents. On montre que le montant maximal qui peut être attribué directement à chaque agent, tout en donnant un problème de partage de coût joint qui constitue encore un jeu de coût, est donné par le minimum des coûts incrémentaux de l'adjonction de l'agent aux coalitions possibles des autres agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Moreaux, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 2002. "Maximal Decompositions of Cost Games into Specific and Joint Costs," Cahiers de recherche 0205, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    • Handle: RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0205
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/w3/recherche/cahiers/2002/0205.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2001. "The Public-Private Sector Risk-Sharing in the French Insurance "Cat. Nat. System"""," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-60, CIRANO.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Howard Kunreuther, 2002. "The Role of Insurance in Managing Extreme Events: Implications for Terrorism Coverage," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(3), pages 427-437, June.
    2. repec:tur:wpaper:3 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Serge Garcia & Alban Thomas, 2002. "An Empirical Analysis of Water Supply Contracts," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-01, CIRANO.
    4. Marcel Dagenais & Claude Montmarquette & Nathalie Viennot-Briot, 2001. "Dropout, School Performance and Working while in School : An Econometric Model with Heterogeneous Groups," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-63, CIRANO.
    5. Michael Faure & Donatella Porrini, 2017. "Göran Skogh on Risk Sharing and Environmental Policy," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 42(2), pages 177-192, April.
    6. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2001. "Incentives in Common Agency," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-66, CIRANO.
    7. Luigi Buzzacchi & Gilberto Turati, 2009. "Collective Risks in Local Administrations: Can a Private Insurer Be Better than a Public Mutual Fund?," Working papers 03, Former Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato", University of Torino.
    8. Ngo Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2005. "Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 421-454, February.
    9. Julie Doonan & Paul Lanoie & Benoit Laplante, 2002. "Environmental Performance of Canadian Pulp and Paper Plants: Why Some Do Well and Others Do Not ?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-24, CIRANO.
    10. John W. Galbraith & Turgut Kisinbay, 2002. "Information Content of Volatility Forecasts at Medium-term Horizons," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-21, CIRANO.
    11. Nathalie de Marcelis-Warin & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2003. "Catastrophe risk sharing and public-private partnerships : From natural disasters to terrorism," Working Papers hal-00242981, HAL.
    12. John W. Galbraith & Serguei Zernov & Victoria Zinde-Walsh, 2001. "Conditional Quantiles of Volatility in Equity Index and Foreign Exchange Data," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-61, CIRANO.
    13. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2002. "The Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-17, CIRANO.
    14. Van Long, Ngo & Shimomura, Koji, 2004. "Relative wealth, status-seeking, and catching-up," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 529-542, April.
    15. Yoshua Bengio & Charles Dugas, 2002. "Forecasting Non-Stationary Volatility with Hyper-Parameters," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-50, CIRANO.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost game; Decomposition;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Manuel Paradis (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/delvlca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.