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Imperfect Information, On-the-Job Training, and the Employer Size-Wage Puzzle: Theory and Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Feng, Shuaizhang

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

  • Zheng, Bingyong

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract
This paper develops a two-period labor market model with imperfect information and on-the-job training, and uses data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohorts (NLSY79) to test its predictions. We find that training does not explain the positive relationship between employer size and wage. In addition, for industries that display size-wage premium, workers in large establishments are more likely to receive on-the-job training but their return to training is smaller. Our theory, substantiated by the new empirical evidence, suggests that it is not large firms, per se, but firms that hire better workers who are paying a wage premium.

Suggested Citation

  • Feng, Shuaizhang & Zheng, Bingyong, 2010. "Imperfect Information, On-the-Job Training, and the Employer Size-Wage Puzzle: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 4998, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4998
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    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp4998.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Floreani, Vincent Arthur, 2014. "Fixing Europe's youth unemployment and skills mismatch, can public financial support to SMEs be effective? The case of the European Commission and European Investment Bank joint initiatives," MPRA Paper 55849, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    imperfect information; sorting; on-the-job training; size-wage premium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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