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Does Local School Control Raise Student Outcomes?: Theory and Evidence on the Roles of School Autonomy and Community Participation

Author

Listed:
  • Gunnarsson, Victoria
  • Orazem, Peter
  • Sanchez, Mario A.
  • Verdisco, Aimee
Abstract
School autonomy and parental participation have been frequently proposed as ways of making schools more productive. Less clear is how governments can foster decentralized decision-making by local schools. This paper shows that across eight Latin-American countries, most of the variation in local control over school decisions exists within and not between countries. That implies that the exercise of local authority to manage schools is largely a local choice only modestly influenced by constitutional stipulations regarding jurisdiction over school personnel, curriculum and facilities. As a consequence, estimated impacts of local school autonomy, parental participation or school supplies on student performance must account for the endogeneity of local efforts to manage schools. Empirical tests confirm that local managerial effort by the principal and the parents and the adequacy of school supplies are strongly influenced by parental human capital and the size and remoteness of the community, and that these effects are only partially moderated by central policies regarding the locus of control over the schools. Correcting for endogeneity, parental participation and adequacy school supplies have strong positive effects on 4th grade test performance, but school autonomy has no discernable impact on school outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Gunnarsson, Victoria & Orazem, Peter & Sanchez, Mario A. & Verdisco, Aimee, 2004. "Does Local School Control Raise Student Outcomes?: Theory and Evidence on the Roles of School Autonomy and Community Participation," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11417, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:11417
    as

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    File URL: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p3829-2004-03-01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Elizabeth M. King & Peter F. Orazem & Elizabeth M. Paterno, 2016. "Promotion with and without Learning: Effects on Student Enrollment and Dropout Behavior," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 30(3), pages 580-602.
    2. Nisha Arunatilake & Priyanka Jayawardena, 2008. "Will Formula-Based Funding and Decentralized Management Improve School Level Resources in Sri Lanka?," Working Papers PMMA 2008-12, PEP-PMMA.
    3. Qin, Lixia & Bowen, Daniel H., 2019. "The distributions of teacher qualification: A cross-national study," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 1-1.
    4. World Bank Group, 2015. "Governance and Finance Analysis of the Basic Education Sector in Nigeria," World Bank Publications - Reports 23683, The World Bank Group.
    5. Emiliana Vegas & Ilana Umansky, 2005. "Improving Teaching and Learning through Effective Incentives : What Can We Learn from Education Reforms in Latin America?," World Bank Publications - Reports 8694, The World Bank Group.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    school; autonomy; performance; parental participation; management; local; central;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General

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