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Negotiation Processes for the Protection of Biodiversity

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Figuières

    (INRA, UMR LAMETA)

  • Stéphanie Aulong

    (Station biologique de la Tour du Valat and UMR LAMETA)

  • Robert Lifran

    (INRA, LAMETA)

Abstract
Consider a developing country that has the potential for biodiversity conservation, and developed countries that benefit from biodiversity but are not in position to produce it. From the statu quo, some incremental protections of biodiversity would be harmful for the developing country but would benefit the developed countries and the world as a whole; in other words, biodiversity protection is a global public good. The negotiation problem is then: how to organize compensation transfers from the developed countries to the developing country to sustain a higher (Pareto optimal) level of biodiversity, given that: i) each developed country has an incentive to free-ride on transfers conceded by others, ii) no supranational authority exists that has both the necessary relevant information on countries's willingness to pay for biodiversity, and the power to impose a socially beneficial profile of transfers? This paper investigates how, and to what extent, the theory of resource allocation processes can shed light into this issue, and how it can be best tailored and qualified to cope with the problem at hand. The focus is put on the incentive properties of the suggested negotiation processes, and their ability to respect countries' sovereignty.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Figuières & Stéphanie Aulong & Robert Lifran, 2005. "Negotiation Processes for the Protection of Biodiversity," IDEP Working Papers 0505, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised May 2005.
  • Handle: RePEc:iep:wpidep:0505
    as

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    File URL: http://www.idep-fr.org/IMG/document/dt/dt0505.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Dynamic Processes for Public Goods: An Institution-Oriented Survey," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 9-48, Springer.
    2. John Roberts, 1979. "Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 283-292.
    3. Champsaur, Paul & Dreze, Jacques H & Henry, Claude, 1977. "Stability Theorems with Economic Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 273-294, March.
    4. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Theoretical Foundations of Negotiations and Cost Sharing in Transfrontier Pollution Problems," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 123-134, Springer.
    5. Scott Barrett, 1994. "The biodiversity supergame," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 111-122, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Stéphanie Aulong & Katrin Erdlenbruch & C. Figuières, 2005. "Un tour d'horizon des critères d'évaluation de la diversité biologique," Post-Print hal-00452144, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Biodiversity; Negotiation Processes; Voting Scheme; Preferences Revelation.;
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