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Does Retailer Power Lead to Exclusion?

Author

Listed:
  • Rey, Patrick
  • Whinston, Michael
Abstract
This paper examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of Marx and Shaffer (2007), who showed that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit-maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to this differing result is that we do not restrict each retailer to offering the manufacturer a single tariff.

Suggested Citation

  • Rey, Patrick & Whinston, Michael, 2011. "Does Retailer Power Lead to Exclusion?," IDEI Working Papers 666, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:24176
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martimort David & Stole Lars, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-40, July.
    2. Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer, 2007. "Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 823-843, September.
    3. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting with Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & Johansen, Bjørn Olav, 2015. "Buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-18.
    2. Rey, Patrick & Vergé, Thibaud, 2016. "Secret contracting in multilateral relations," TSE Working Papers 16-744, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2020.
    3. Nocke, Volker & Rey, Patrick, 2018. "Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 183-221.
    4. Roberto Burguet & József Sákovics, 2017. "Competitive foreclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(4), pages 906-926, December.
    5. Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicolò & Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2020. "The demand‐boost theory of exclusive dealing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 713-738, September.
    6. Claire Chambolle & Clémence Christin, 2017. "New Product Introduction and Slotting Fees," Working Papers hal-01458949, HAL.
    7. Yaron Yehezkel, 2014. "Motivating a Supplier to Test Product Quality," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 309-345, June.
    8. Johannes Münster & Markus Reisinger, 2021. "Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 096, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    9. V. Bhaskar & Nikita Roketskiy, 2021. "Consumer privacy and serial monopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 917-944, December.
    10. Caprice, Stéphane & von Schlippenbach, Vanessa & Wey, Christian, 2014. "Supplier Fixed costs and Retail Market Monopolization," TSE Working Papers 14-524, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    11. Ramon Fauli‐Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2021. "Buyer power, product assortment and asymmetric retail formats," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 196-211, April.
    12. Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicol?, 2013. "Competition with Exclusive Contracts and Market-Share Discounts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2384-2411, October.
    13. Chambolle, Claire & Christin, Clémence & Molina, Hugo, 2023. "Buyer power and exclusion: A progress report," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    14. Cecilia Vergari & Luigi Filippini, 2023. "Innovation Diffusion and Strategic Outside Option in a Bargaining Game," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(1), pages 41-71, August.
    15. Lømo, Teis Lunde & Meland, Frode & Sandvik, Håvard Mork, 2020. "Do slotting allowances reduce product variety?," Working Papers in Economics 7/20, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    16. Claire Chambolle & Clémence Christin, 2021. "New Product Introduction and Slotting Fees," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 410-442, June.
    17. Ulsaker, Simen A., 2016. "Interlocking relationships and quantity rationing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 47-49.
    18. Alipranti, Maria & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2020. "Fixed fee discounts and Bertrand competition in vertically related markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 19-26.
    19. Ulsaker, Simen A., 2016. "Menu contracts and the division of profits in vertical relationships," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 72-74.
    20. Roberto Burguet & Jozsef Sakovics, 2016. "Bidding for input in oligopoly," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 266, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    21. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2014. "Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 325-347, February.
    22. David E. Mills, 2017. "Buyer‐Induced Exclusive Dealing," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 66-81, July.
    23. Enrique Ide & Juan-Pablo Montero & Nicolás Figueroa, 2016. "Discounts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(7), pages 1849-1877, July.

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