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Targeting versus Universalism: An Evaluation of Indirect Effects of the Employment Guarantee Scheme in India

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Abstract
Although a workfare scheme is potentially a cost-effective poverty alleviation scheme as it attracts only the poor who have an incentive to do unskilled manual works, an investigation of the ICRISAT data in India clarifies that the Employment Guarantee Scheme was mistargeted, i.e., a substantial share of the non-poor also participated. The comparison of the EGS and universalism through the villagelevel SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) model reveals that the former is neither efficient nor equitable than the latter unless the state government carefully designs the scheme so that the EGS assets, such as irrigation facilities, are made accessible to the poor without undermining their positive effects on agricultural productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Katsushi Imai, 2004. "Targeting versus Universalism: An Evaluation of Indirect Effects of the Employment Guarantee Scheme in India," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/07, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2004.
    • Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0407
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    1. Datt, Gaurav & Ravallion, Martin, 1994. "Transfer Benefits from Public-Works Employment: Evidence for Rural India," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1346-1369, November.
    2. Martin Ravallion & Gaurav Datt, 1995. "Is Targeting Through a Work Requirement Efficient? Some Evidence for Rural India," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-41, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    3. Raghav Gaiha, 1997. "Do rural public works influence agricultural wages? The case of the employment guarantee scheme in India," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(3), pages 301-314.
    4. Bigman, David & Srinivasan, P. V., 2002. "Geographical targeting of poverty alleviation programs: methodology and applications in rural India," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 237-255, June.
    5. Baland, Jean-Marie & Dreze, Jean & Leruth, Luc, 1999. "Daily wages and piece rates in agrarian economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 445-461, August.
    6. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-261, March.
    7. Ravallion, Martin, 1991. "Reaching the Rural Poor through Public Employment: Arguments, Evidence, and Lessons from South Asia," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 6(2), pages 153-175, July.
    8. Christopher Barrett & Daniel Clay, 2003. "How Accurate is Food-for-Work Self-Targeting in the Presence of Imperfect Factor Markets? Evidence from Ethiopia," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(5), pages 152-180.
    9. Ravallion, Martin & Datt, Gaurav & Chaudhuri, Shubham, 1993. "Does Maharashtra's Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment? Effects of the 1988 Wage Increase," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 251-275, January.
    10. Raghav Gaiha, 1996. "How dependent are the rural poor on the employment guarantee scheme in India?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(5), pages 669-694.
    11. Narayana, N. S. S. & Parikh, Kirit S. & Srinivasan, T. N., 1988. "Rural works programs in India: Costs and benefits," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 131-156, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laura Camfield, 2014. "Growing Up in Ethiopia and Andhra Pradesh: The Impact of Social Protection Schemes on Girls’ Roles and Responsibilities," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 26(1), pages 107-123, January.
    2. Bannò, Mariasole & Sgobbi, Francesca, 2010. "Firm participation in financial incentive programmes: The case of subsidies for outward internationalisation," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 792-803, November.
    3. Dey, S., 2010. "Evaluating India's national rural employment guarantee scheme," ISS Working Papers - General Series 18703, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    4. Sarabjeet D. Natesan & Rahul R. Marathe, 2021. "MGNREGA Implementation in Tamil Nadu: Voices from the fields," Indian Journal of Human Development, , vol. 15(1), pages 128-137, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asia; India; EGS; poverty; targeting; indirect effect; SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy

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