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A family of simple paternalistic transfer models

Author

Listed:
  • Andras Simonovits

    (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences also Mathematical Institute, Budapest University of Technology, and Department of Economics, CEU)

Abstract
A general framework is analyzed which contains several special transfer (tax and pension) models. In our static two-overlapping-generation framework, every individual works in the first stage of the adult age, while is retired in the second. The government operates a balanced linear transfer system, sometimes with caps. In the models, the individuals may optimize their situation in various ways: contributing to voluntary pension, restraining labor supply and underreporting wages. Individuals are typically short-sighted, therefore they choose paternalistically suboptimal decisions. The models provide useful information on the socially optimal paternalistic transfer system.

Suggested Citation

  • Andras Simonovits, 2013. "A family of simple paternalistic transfer models," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1324, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1324
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax systems; pension systems; pension models; overlapping generations; paternalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies

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