The analogical foundations of cooperation
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105609
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Other versions of this item:
- Jehiel, Philippe & Samuelson, Larry, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2022. "The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation," PSE Working Papers halshs-03754101, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2022. "The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation," Working Papers halshs-03754101, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-04331552, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Analogical reasoning; Cooperation; Prisoners' dilemma; Repeated game; Private monitoring;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
Statistics
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