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Low prices cum selective distribution versus high prices: how best to signal quality?

Author

Listed:
  • Nada Ben Elhadj

    (ISG - Institut Supérieur de Gestion de Tunis [Tunis] - Université de Tunis)

  • Didier Laussel

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
We investigate the best signalling strategy for a monopoly introducing a new product with unobservable quality when second-period sales are linked to first-period ones and the firm may tailor its distribution network to exclude some consumers. When producing a high quality product rather than a low quality one is relatively costly with respect to the increase in quality, optimal signalling is by price alone. But when the cost differential is lower, it will be optimal to set a low first-period price, not to serve all would-be consumers at this price (selective distribution) and raise the price afterwards. Paradoxically, this strategy allows a larger customer base to be reached than in the case of pure price signalling.

Suggested Citation

  • Nada Ben Elhadj & Didier Laussel, 2017. "Low prices cum selective distribution versus high prices: how best to signal quality?," Post-Print hal-01658369, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01658369
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2017.1284988
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-01658369
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hao Zhao, 2000. "Raising Awareness and Signaling Quality to Uninformed Consumers: A Price-Advertising Model," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(4), pages 390-396, January.
    2. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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