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Incentive Regulatory Policies: the Case of Public Transit Systems in France

Author

Listed:
  • Gagnepain, P.
  • Ivaldi, M.
Abstract
This paper is aimed at assesssing the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation inspired by the theory of incentives. It contributes to the econometrics of asymmetric information models by using the principal-agent framework for studying the regulatory schemes used in French urban transport industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Gagnepain, P. & Ivaldi, M., 1999. "Incentive Regulatory Policies: the Case of Public Transit Systems in France," Papers 99.515, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.515
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harry F. Campbell, 1975. "Deadweight Loss and Commodity Taxation in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 8(3), pages 441-447, August.
    2. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2002. "Stochastic Frontiers and Asymmetric Information Models," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 145-159, September.
    3. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    5. Vuong, Quang H, 1989. "Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 307-333, March.
    6. Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, 1989. "Regulatory Options and Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 405-416, Autumn.
    7. Jondrow, James & Knox Lovell, C. A. & Materov, Ivan S. & Schmidt, Peter, 1982. "On the estimation of technical inefficiency in the stochastic frontier production function model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 233-238, August.
    8. Magnus, Jan R., 1982. "Multivariate error components analysis of linear and nonlinear regression models by maximum likelihood," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 239-285, August.
    9. Alan D. Mathios & Robert P. Rogers, 1989. "The Impact of Alternative Forms of State Regulation of AT&T on Direct-Dial, Long-Distance Telephone Rates," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 437-453, Autumn.
    10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1996. "Industrial policy and politics," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
    11. Dag Morten Dalen & Gomez-Lobo, Gomez-Lobo, 1996. "Regulation and incentive contracts: An empirical investigation of the Norwegian bus transport industry," IFS Working Papers W96/08, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    12. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:02 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    14. Cornwell, C. & Schmidt, P., 1993. "Production Frontiers and Efficiency Measurement," Papers 427e, Georgia - College of Business Administration, Department of Economics.
    15. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    16. Gasmi, F & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Sharkey, W W, 1997. "Incentive Regulation and the Cost Structure of the Local Telephone Exchange Network," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 5-25, July.
    17. Cornwell, Christopher & Schmidt, Peter & Sickles, Robin C., 1990. "Production frontiers with cross-sectional and time-series variation in efficiency levels," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1-2), pages 185-200.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    INCENTIVES ; BEHAVIOUR ; REGULATION;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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