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Bankruptcy and collateral in debt constrained markets

Author

Listed:
  • Timothy J. Kehoe
  • David K. Levine
Abstract
Typical models of bankruptcy and collateral rely on incomplete asset markets. In fact, bankruptcy and collateral add contingencies to asset markets. In some models, these contingencies can be used by consumers to achieve the same equilibrium allocations as in models with complete markets. In particular, the equilibrium allocation in the debt constrained model of Kehoe and Levine (2001) can be implemented in a model with bankruptcy and collateral. The equilibrium allocation is constrained efficient. Bankruptcy occurs when consumers receive low income shocks. The implementation of the debt constrained allocation in a model with bankruptcy and collateral is fragile in the sense of Leijonhufvud's \\"corridor of stability,\\" however: If the environment changes, the equilibrium allocation is no longer constrained efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 2006. "Bankruptcy and collateral in debt constrained markets," Staff Report 380, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:380
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    8. Igor Livshits & James MacGee & Michèle Tertilt, 2007. "Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 402-418, March.
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    10. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 1988. "Default and Efficiency in a General Equilibrium Model with Incomplete Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 879R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 1989.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Borys Grochulski, 2007. "Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design: A Mirrlees Approach," 2007 Meeting Papers 1008, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2018. "Optimal Exclusion," Diskussionsschriften dp1814, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    3. Borys Grochulski, 2010. "Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design under Moral Hazard," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 350-378, April.
    4. S. Viswanathan & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Collateral, Financial Intermediation, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity," 2008 Meeting Papers 116, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Adriano A Rampini & S Viswanathan, 2019. "Financial Intermediary Capital," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 413-455.
    6. Borghan Nezami Narajabad & Cyril Monnet, 2012. "Why Rent When You Can Buy? A Theory of Repurchase Agreements," 2012 Meeting Papers 647, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Cyril Monnet & Borghan N. Narajabad, 2017. "Why Rent When You Can Buy?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-094, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Igor Livshits, 2015. "Recent Developments In Consumer Credit And Default Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 594-613, September.
    9. Gordon, Grey, 2017. "Optimal bankruptcy code: A fresh start for some," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 123-149.
    10. Hiroshi FUJIKI, 2016. "Nontraditional Monetary Policy in a Model of Default Risks and Collateral in the Absence of Commitment," Working Papers e104, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    11. Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2014. "Consumer default with complete markets: default-based pricing and finite punishment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 549-583, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt; Bankruptcy;

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing

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