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Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network

Author

Listed:
  • Lionel Richefort

    (Nantes-Atlantic Economics and Management Laboratory (LEMNA), University of Nantes – IEMN)

  • Patrick Point

    (Research Group on Theoretical and Applied Economics (GREThA),University of Bordeaux 4 – CNRS)

Abstract
A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France).

Suggested Citation

  • Lionel Richefort & Patrick Point, 2010. "Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network," Working Papers 2010.147, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.147
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    Cited by:

    1. Bayer, Péter & Kozics, György & Szőke, Nóra Gabriella, 2023. "Best-response dynamics in directed network games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common-pool Resource; Digraph; Cycle; Independent Set; Empirical Example;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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