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Generalized rationing problems and solutions

Author

Listed:
  • Pere Timoner Lledó

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract
An extension of the standard rationing model is introduced. Agents are not only identified by their respective claims on some amount of a scarce resource, but also by some exogenous ex-ante conditions (initial stock of resource or net worth of agents, for instance), different from claims. Within this framework, we define a generalization of the constrained equal awards rule. We provide two different characterizations of this generalized rule. Finally, we use the corresponding dual properties to characterize a generalization of the constrained equal losses rule

Suggested Citation

  • Pere Timoner Lledó & Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar, 2015. "Generalized rationing problems and solutions," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2015/329, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:329web
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ub.edu/ubeconomics/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/329WEB.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Timoner, Pere & Izquierdo, Josep M., 2016. "Rationing problems with ex-ante conditions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 46-52.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rationing; Equal awards rule; Equal losses rule; Ex-ante conditions; Claims problema.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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