Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
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- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 3200614, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999. "Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Papers 9-99, Tel Aviv.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, "undated". "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
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- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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