[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/86162.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Fiscal unions redux

Author

Listed:
  • Kehoe, Patrick J.
Abstract
Before the advent of sophisticated international Önancial markets, a widely accepted belief was that within a monetary union, a union-wide authority orchestrating Öscal transfers between countries is necessary to provide adequate insurance against country-speciÖc economic áuctuations. A natural question is then: Do sophisticated international Önancial markets obviate the need for such an active union-wide authority? We argue that they do. SpeciÖcally, we show that in a benchmark economy with no international Önancial markets, an activist union-wide authority is necessary to achieve desirable outcomes. With sophisticated Önancial markets, however, such an authority is unnecessary if its only goal is to provide cross-country insurance. Since restricting the set of policy instruments available to member countries does not create a Öscal externality across them, this result holds in a wide variety of settings. Finally, we establish that an activist union-wide authority concerned just with providing insurance across member countries is optimal only when individual countries are either unable or unwilling to pursue desirable policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kehoe, Patrick J., 2017. "Fiscal unions redux," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86162, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:86162
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86162/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    • Patrick J. Kehoe & Elena Pastorino, 2017. "Fiscal unions redux," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 741-776, December.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gali­, Jordi & Monacelli, Tommaso, 2008. "Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 116-132, September.
    2. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2007. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2399-2408, November.
    3. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2017. "Fiscal Unions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(12), pages 3788-3834, December.
    4. Varadarajan V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2008. "Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(7), pages 1329-1356, October.
    5. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath, 2013. "Crisis and Commitment: Inflation Credibility and the Vulnerability to Sovereign Debt Crises," Working Papers 2013-4, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    6. Jordi Galí & Tommaso Monacelli, 2005. "Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 707-734.
    7. Obstfeld, Maurice & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1995. "Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 624-660, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Berriel, Rafael & Gonzalez-Aguado, Eugenia & Kehoe, Patrick J. & Pastorino, Elena, 2024. "Is a fiscal union optimal for a monetary union?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 157-177.
    2. Xuan Wang, 2019. "When Do Currency Unions Benefit From Default ?," 2019 Papers pwa938, Job Market Papers.
    3. Xuan Wang, 2021. "Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-009/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Cristina Arellano & Timothy J. Kehoe & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2017. "Introduction to the Special Issue on Models of Debt and Debt Crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 605-610, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Patrick J. Kehoe & Elena Pastorino, 2017. "Financial Markets and Fiscal Unions," NBER Working Papers 23235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. J.M.C. Santos Silva & Silvana Tenreyro, 2010. "Currency Unions in Prospect and Retrospect," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 51-74, September.
    3. Matthew Greenblatt, 2020. "Bailouts, Inflation, and Risk-Sharing in Monetary Unions," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 48(3), pages 269-296, September.
    4. Dmitriev, Mikhail & Hoddenbagh, Jonathan, 2019. "Optimal fiscal transfers in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 91-108.
    5. Troug, Haytem, 2019. "Monetary Policy with Non-Separable Government Spending," MPRA Paper 92323, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Bletzinger, Tilman & von Thadden, Leopold, 2021. "Designing QE in a fiscally sound monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    7. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath, 2015. "Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(4), pages 1727-1779.
    8. Roel Beetsma & Massimo Giuliodori, 2010. "The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the EMU and Other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 603-641, September.
    9. Mikhail Dmitriev & Jonathan Hoddenbagh, 2021. "Optimal Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies: Producer-Currency Pricing," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(2), pages 297-338, June.
    10. Debrun, Xavier & Masuch, Klaus & Ferrero, Guiseppe & Vansteenkiste, Isabel & Ferdinandusse, Marien & von Thadden, Leopold & Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Alloza, Mario & Derouen, Chloé & Bańkowski, Krzyszto, 2021. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 273, European Central Bank.
    11. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "The theoretical roots of EMU institutions and policies during the crisis," Working Papers 126/14, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e Modelli per l'Economia, il Territorio e la Finanza MEMOTEF.
    12. Lorenzoni, Guido, 2014. "International Financial Crises," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 689-740, Elsevier.
    13. Xing Guo & Pablo Ottonello & Diego J. Perez, 2023. "Monetary Policy and Redistribution in Open Economies," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 191-241.
    14. Haytem Troug, 2020. "Monetary policy with non-separable government spending," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 426-449, January.
    15. Christian R. Proano, 2009. "Heterogenous Behavioral Expectations, FX Fluctuations and Dynamic Stability in a Stylized Two-Country Macroeconomic Model," IMK Working Paper 03-2009, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    16. Haytem Troug & Ernil Sabaj, 2023. "Monetary policy in a small open economy with non-separable government spending," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 51(1), pages 39-70, October.
    17. Joseba Martinez & Thomas Philippon & Markus Sihvonen, 2019. "Does a Currency Union Need a Capital Market Union? Risk Sharing via Banks and Markets," NBER Working Papers 26026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Alvarez, Fernando & Dixit, Avinash, 2014. "A real options perspective on the future of the Euro," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 78-109.
    19. Pasquale Foresti, 2018. "Monetary And Fiscal Policies Interaction In Monetary Unions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 226-248, February.
    20. Dmitriy Sergeyev, 2016. "Optimal Macroprudential and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union," 2016 Meeting Papers 463, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cross-country externalities; Cross-country insurance; Cross-country transfers; Fiscal externalities; international Önancial markets; International transfers; Optimal currency area;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:86162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.