CEO compensation: evidence from the field
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- Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
- Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2021. "CEO compensation: evidence from the field," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118860, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2021. "CEO Compensation: Evidence From the Field," CEPR Discussion Papers 16315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alex Edmans & Tom Gosling & Dirk Jenter, 2021. "CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Field," CESifo Working Paper Series 9162, CESifo.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Peter Cziraki & Dirk Jenter, 2021.
"The Market for CEOs,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
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- Cziraki, Peter & Jenter, Dirk, 2021. "The market for CEOs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118872, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jenter, Dirk & Cziraki, Peter, 2021. "The Market for CEOs," CEPR Discussion Papers 16281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- John Bizjak & Swaminathan Kalpathy & Zhichuan Frank Li & Brian Young, 2022. "The Choice of Peers for Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation [Peer choice in CEO compensation]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1217-1239.
- Matthias Efing & Stefanie Ehmann & Patrick Kampkötter & Raphael Moritz, 2024. "All Hat and No Cattle? ESG Incentives in Executive Compensation," Working Papers hal-04754859, HAL.
- Morten Grindaker & Andreas R. Kostøl & Kasper Roszbach, 2021. "Executive Labor Market Frictions, Corporate Bankruptcy and CEO Careers," Working Paper 2021/15, Norges Bank.
- Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2024. "Prestige, promotion, and pay," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118369, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Peter Iliev & Lukas Roth, 2023. "Director Expertise and Corporate Sustainability," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(6), pages 2085-2123.
- Efing, Matthias & Ehmann, Stefanie & Kampkötter, Patrick & Moritz, Raphael, 2024. "All Hat and No Cattle? ESG Incentives in Executive Compensation," HEC Research Papers Series 1507, HEC Paris.
- Dupuy, Arnaud & Kennes, John & Lyng, Ran Sun, 2021. "The Market for CEOs: Building Legacy and Feeling Empowered Matter," IZA Discussion Papers 14803, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Xiong, Yan & Jiang, Xu, 2022. "Economic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2).
- Matthias Efing & Stefanie Ehmann & Patrick Kampkötter & Raphael Moritz, 2024.
"All Hat and No Cattle? ESG Incentives in Executive Compensation,"
Working Papers
hal-04754859, HAL.
- Matthias Efing & Stefanie Ehmann & Patrick Kampkötter & Raphael Moritz, 2024. "All Hat and No Cattle? ESG Incentives in Executive Compensation," CESifo Working Paper Series 11407, CESifo.
- Efing, Matthias & Ehmann, Stefanie & Kampkötter, Patrick & Moritz, Raphael, 2024. "All Hat and No Cattle? ESG Incentives in Executive Compensation," HEC Research Papers Series 1507, HEC Paris.
- Colonnello, Stefano & Koetter, Michael & Wagner, Konstantin, 2023. "Compensation regulation in banking: Executive director behavior and bank performance after the EU bonus cap," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1).
- Aabo, Tom & Jacobsen, Mikkel Lilholt & Stendys, Kasper, 2022. "Pay me with fame, not mammon: CEO narcissism, compensation, and media coverage," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PB).
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More about this item
Keywords
CEO incentives; contract theory; executive compensation; fairness; survey; STICERD grant;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2023-11-27 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-HRM-2023-11-27 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
Statistics
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