Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations
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- Miller, Nolan H. & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Johnson, Scott, 2007. "Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 476-496, September.
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Cited by:
- , & ,, 2015.
"Implementation with interdependent valuations,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
- Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001242, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Song, Yangwei, 2018. "Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 693-726.
- Guo, Huiyi, 2019. "Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: An analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 76-105.
- Dobzinski, Shahar & Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert, 2015. "Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 349-369.
- Papakonstantinou, Athanasios & Bogetoft, Peter, 2017. "Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(3), pages 1171-1180.
- Gizatulina, Alia & Hellwig, Martin, 2010.
"Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2260-2281, November.
- Alia Gizatulina & Martin Hellwig, 2009. "Informational Smallness and the Scope for Limiting Information Rents," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_28, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Papakonstantinou, A. & Bogetoft, P., 2013.
"Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach,"
MPRA Paper
46055, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Papakonstantinou, A. & Bogetoft, P., 2013. "Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach," MPRA Paper 44236, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022.
"Epistemological implementation of social choice functions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Song, Yangwei, 2018. "Efficient Implementation with Interdependent Valuations and Maxmin Agents," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 92, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Boaz Zik, 2023. "Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 567-590, February.
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