'Steeling' House Votes at Low Prices for the Steel Import Quota Bill of 1999
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Other versions of this item:
- Robert C. Fisher & Omer Gokcekus & Edward Tower, 2004. "'Steeling' House Votes at Low Prices for the Steel Import Quota Bill of 1999," Contributions to Economic Analysis, in: The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Essays in Honor of J. Michael Finger, pages 105-129, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
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Cited by:
- Wang, Xiaosong & Li, Kunwang & Xie, Shenxiang & Hou, Jack, 2013. "How is U.S. trade policy towards China determined?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 25-36.
- John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2012.
"Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 745-769, March.
- John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2011. "Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China," Working Papers 201102, Utah State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
- John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2011. "Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China," Working Papers 2011-02, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
- Benjamin H. Liebman & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006.
"The returns from rent-seeking: campaign contributions, firm subsidies and the Byrd Amendment,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1345-1369, November.
- Benjamin H. Liebman & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006. "The returns from rent‐seeking: campaign contributions, firm subsidies and the Byrd Amendment," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(4), pages 1345-1369, November.
- Benjamin Liebman & Kara M. Olson, 2004. "The Returns from Rent-Seeking: Campaign Contributions, Firm Subsidies, and the Byrd Amendment," International Trade 0408003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-POL-2003-02-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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