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Credit, Wages and Bankruptcy Laws

Author

Listed:
  • Biais, Bruno
  • Mariotti, Thomas
Abstract
We study the impact of different bankruptcy laws in general equilibrium, taking into account the interactions between the credit and labour markets, as well as wealth heterogeneity. Soft bankruptcy laws often preclude liquidation, to avoid ex-post inefficiencies. This worsens credit rationing, depresses investment and reduces aggregate leverage. Yet, tough laws do not necessarily maximize social welfare or emerge from the legislative process. Relatively rich agents can invest irrespective of the law. They favour soft laws that exclude poorer entrepreneurs from the market and thus reduce labour demand and wages. This raises the pledgeable income of the entrepreneurs who still can raise funds, and thus lowers their liquidation rates and the associated inefficiencies. Hence, a soft law can maximize social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Biais, Bruno & Mariotti, Thomas, 2003. "Credit, Wages and Bankruptcy Laws," CEPR Discussion Papers 3996, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3996
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    Cited by:

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    2. Janiak, Alexandre, 2013. "Structural unemployment and the costs of firm entry and exit," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 1-19.
    3. Hajime Tomura, 2007. "Firms Dynamics, Bankruptcy Laws and Total Factor Productivity," Staff Working Papers 07-17, Bank of Canada.
    4. Madhav S, Aney & Maitreesh Ghatak & Massimo Morelli, 2011. "Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure?," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 029, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    5. Anyangah, Joshua O., 2017. "Creditor rights protection, tort claims and credit," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 29-43.
    6. Tarantino, Emanuele, 2013. "Bankruptcy law and corporate investment decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 2490-2500.
    7. Madestam, Andreas, 2014. "Informal finance: A theory of moneylenders," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 157-174.
    8. Kolecek, Ludek, 2008. "Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 40-61, April.
    9. Enrico Perotti, 2013. "The Political Economy of Finance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-034/IV/DSF53, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Rossi, Stefano & Yun, Hayong, 2024. "The political economy of municipal bankruptcy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    11. Ondøej Knot & Ondøej Vychodil, 2005. "What Drives the Optimal Bankruptcy Law Design? (in English)," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 55(3-4), pages 110-123, March.
    12. N.V.V. Satyanarayana Puchakayala & Ramanujam Veluchamy, 2023. "Optimal bankruptcy regime: a literature review," Future Business Journal, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 1-10, December.
    13. Vladimir Asriyan & Luc Laeven & Alberto Martin & Alejandro Van der Ghote & Victoria Vanasco, 2021. "Falling Interest Rates and Credit Misallocation: Lessons from General Equilibrium," Working Papers 1268, Barcelona School of Economics.
    14. Besley, Tim & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "The de Soto Effect," CEPR Discussion Papers 7259, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Franks, Julian & Sussman, Oren, 2005. "Financial innovations and corporate bankruptcy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-317, July.
    16. Vladimir Asriyan & Luc Laeven & Alberto Martin & Alejandro Van der Ghote & Victoria Vanasco, 2021. "Falling interest rates and credit reallocation: Lessons from general equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 1784, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2022.
    17. Koji Asano, 2022. "Trust and Law in Credit Markets," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(354), pages 332-361, April.
    18. Aney, Madhav S. & Ghatak, Maitreesh & Morelli, Massimo, 2016. "Credit market frictions and political failure," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 48-64.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial constraints; Credit rationing; Bankruptcy law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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