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A Model of Market and Political Power Interactions for Southern Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Kollintzas, Tryphon
  • Vassilatos, Vanghelis
  • Papageorgiou, Dimitris
Abstract
In recent years the growth pattern of most Southern European countries has been disturbed, as those countries are suffering from economic crises that go beyond the usual business cycle. In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of market and political power interactions that explains this growth reversal. Moreover, the model is consistent with several stylized facts of those countries, where wages in the public sector relative to the private sector are high and these wage differentials correlate negatively with public sector employment over total employment, total factor productivity, and output growth. The model is a synthesis of the insiders-outsiders labor market structure and the concept of an elite government. Outsiders form a group of workers that supply labor to a competitive private sector. And, insiders form a group of workers that enjoy market power in supplying labor to the public sector and influence the policy decisions of government, including those that affect the development and maintenance of public sector infrastructures.

Suggested Citation

  • Kollintzas, Tryphon & Vassilatos, Vanghelis & Papageorgiou, Dimitris, 2015. "A Model of Market and Political Power Interactions for Southern Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 10359, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10359
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Maria M. Campos & Domenico Depalo & Evangelia Papapetrou & Javier J. Pérez & Roberto Ramos, 2017. "Understanding the public sector pay gap," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 6(1), pages 1-29, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Growth; Insiders - outsiders; Politicoeconomic equilibrium; Public sector wage premium; Southern european economies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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