Contracts and Externalities: How Things Fall Apart
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- Genicot, Garance & Ray, Debraj, 2006. "Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 71-100, November.
- Garance Genicot and Debraj Ray, 2003. "Contracts and Externalities: How Things Fall Apart," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-30, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
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