Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information
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Note: In : Mathematics of Operations Research, 10(1), 117-153, 1985
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004.
"Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 May 2003.
- Martin Cripps & George J Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000060, David K. Levine.
- Cripps,M.W. & Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 2002. "Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations," Working papers 17, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2007.
"Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 287-316, May.
- Cripps,M.W. & Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 2004. "Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000152, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Martin Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000086, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Martin W. Cripps & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-031, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2004.
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- James Bergin, 1986. "Information Revelation in Infinitely Repeated Incomplete Information Games," Discussion Papers 692, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jérôme Renault, 2006. "The Value of Markov Chain Games with Lack of Information on One Side," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(3), pages 490-512, August.
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998.
"Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
- Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers 9624, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996. "Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," THEMA Working Papers 96-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 109-118.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2003.
"Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 433-462, August.
- Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Game Theory and Information 0004003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan Thomas, 2001. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 76, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags," Papers 2012.07238, arXiv.org.
- Fabien Gensbittel & Jérôme Renault, 2015. "The Value of Markov Chain Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 820-841, October.
- Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2018.
"Sender–receiver games with cooperation,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 52-61.
- Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2017. "Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 17, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst, 2018. "Sender-receiver games with cooperation," Post-Print hal-02313962, HAL.
- S. S. Askar & A. Al-khedhairi, 2019. "Analysis of a Four-Firm Competition Based on a Generalized Bounded Rationality and Different Mechanisms," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-12, May.
- Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997.
"A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
- Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995. "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers 9518, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bergin, James, 1989.
"A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 51-65, February.
- James Bergin, 1986. "A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium Strategies in Infinitely Repeated Incomplete Information Games," Discussion Papers 686, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
- Zheng Peng & Wenxing Zhu, 2013. "An Alternating Direction Method for Nash Equilibrium of Two-Person Games with Alternating Offers," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 157(2), pages 533-551, May.
- Tristan Tomala, 2013.
"Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(4), pages 617-637, November.
- Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-01026126, HAL.
- Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022.
"Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022. "Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt1fb0j67c, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
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