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The axiomatic approah to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes

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  • BERGANTINOS, Gustavo
  • MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D
Abstract
We explore in this paper the axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes. We formalize two models for this problem on the grounds of two different informational bases. In both models, we provide axiomatic rationale for natural rules to solve the problem. We, nonetheless, obtain drastic differences under each scenario, which highlights the importance of setting the appropriate informational basis of the problem.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • BERGANTINOS, Gustavo & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D, 2015. "The axiomatic approah to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2646, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2646
    Note: In : Games and Economic Behavior, 89, 78-92, 2015
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    1. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    2. Ginsburgh, Victor & Zang, Israel, 2003. "The museum pass game and its value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 322-325, May.
    3. Casas-Méndez, Balbina & Fragnelli, Vito & García-Jurado, Ignacio, 2011. "Weighted bankruptcy rules and the museum pass problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(1), pages 161-168, November.
    4. M. Angeles de Frutos, 1999. "Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 255-272.
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    7. Balbina Casas-Mendez & Vito Fragnelli & Ignacio Garcìa-Jurado, 2014. "A survey of allocation rules for the museum pass problem," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 38(2), pages 191-205, May.
    8. William Thomson, 2001. "On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(2), pages 327-386.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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