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Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem

Author

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  • EYCKMANS, Johan
  • TULKENS, Henry
Abstract
In this paper we test empirically with the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model the core property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997). This scheme is designed to sustain full cooperation in a voluntary internationalenvironmental agreement by making all countries at least as well off as theywould be by joining coalitions adopting emission abatement policies that maximize their coalition payoff; under the scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries would have an interest in leaving the international environmental agreement. The simulations show that the transfer scheme yields an allocation in the core of the carbon emission abatement game associated with the RICE model. Finally, we discuss some practical implications of the transfer scheme for current climate negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, 1999. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1999026
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 153-175, Springer.
    2. Nordhaus, William D & Yang, Zili, 1996. "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 741-765, September.
    3. Henry Tulkens, 2006. "An Economic Model of International Negotiations Relating to Transfrontier Pollution," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 107-121, Springer.
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    5. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 176-193, Springer.
    6. Nick Hanley & Henk Folmer (ed.), 1998. "Game Theory and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1083.
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    8. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    9. Marc Germain & Philippe Toint & Henry Tulkens & Aart Zeeuw, 2006. "Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 251-274, Springer.
    10. Parkash Chandler & Henry Tulkens & Jean-Pascal Ypersele & Stephane Willems, 2006. "The Kyoto Protocol: An Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 195-215, Springer.
    11. GERMAIN , Marc & TOINT , Philippe & TULKENS, Henry, 1997. "Financial transfers to ensure cooperative international optimality in stock pollutant abatement," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    12. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
    13. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0317, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    14. TULKENS, Henry, 1998. "Cooperation versus free-riding in international environmental affairs: two approaches," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1339, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Hackl, Franz & Pruckner, Gerald J., 2003. "How global is the solution to global warming?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 93-117, January.
    16. Eyckmans, Johan, 1997. "Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International Pollution Control Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 314-330, July.
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