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Partage des coûts et tarification des infrastructures - Les jeux de coûts : Définitions et propriétés souhaitables des solutions

Author

Listed:
  • Marcel Boyer
  • Michel Moreaux
  • Michel Truchon
Abstract
In this document, we present the notion of a cost game, defined as a cooperative game where the gain from cooperation is the cost reduction obtained when the projects of a set of agents are realized in a coordinated way. The problem is then to decide how this gain will be shared among agents or similarly how the joint realization of the projects will be financed. We survey the different types of cost games and we introduce the notions of pre-solution and solution, as well as the usual properties that a solution should satisfy. On présente, dans ce mémoire, la notion de jeu de coûts. Un jeu de coûts est défini comme un jeu coopératif dans lequel le gain de la coopération est la réduction des dépenses permise par la réalisation coordonnée des projets d'un ensemble d'agents. Le problème est alors de savoir comment ces agents vont se répartir ce gain, c'est-à-dire cette réduction de coûts, ou de façon équivalente comment ils vont contribuer au financement de la dépense ainsi occasionnée. On recense les principaux types de jeux de coûts et on introduit les notions de pré-solution et de solution. Enfin on passe en revue les propriétés habituellement requises d'une solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux & Michel Truchon, 2002. "Partage des coûts et tarification des infrastructures - Les jeux de coûts : Définitions et propriétés souhaitables des solutions," CIRANO Project Reports 2002rp-20, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirpro:2002rp-20
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2002RP-20.pdf
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