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All Symmetric Equilibria in Differential Games with Public Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Niko Jaakkola
  • Florian Wagener
  • Florian O.O. Wagener
Abstract
We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is constructed. The equilibrium in continuous strategies, unique in our context, is Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium. If a Pareto-undominated steady state exists, it is sustained by trigger-like strategies, with deviations above and below the steady state leading to different responses. We extend the theory of differential games to deal with payoffs under discontinuous strategies. Our methods work under general functional forms.

Suggested Citation

  • Niko Jaakkola & Florian Wagener & Florian O.O. Wagener, 2020. "All Symmetric Equilibria in Differential Games with Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 8246, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8246
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8246.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes M. Schumacher & Puduru Viswanadha Reddy & Jacob C. Engwerda, 2022. "Jump Equilibria in Public-Good Differential Games with a Single State Variable," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 784-812, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    differential games; Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium; dynamic investment games; dynamic public goods; climate change;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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