Local and Global Pollution and International Environmental Agreements in a Network Approach
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- Günther, Michael & Hellmann, Tim, 2015. "Local and Global Pollution and International Environmental Agreements in a Network Approach," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112944, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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More about this item
Keywords
Weak renegotiation-proofness; Coalition structures; International environmental agreements; Networks;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENE-2015-09-11 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2015-09-11 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2015-09-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2015-09-11 (Network Economics)
- NEP-RES-2015-09-11 (Resource Economics)
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