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Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory

Author

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  • Trockel, Walter

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract
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  • Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 322, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:322
    as

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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2909880/2910111
    File Function: First Version, 2001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    3. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    4. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.
    5. Yildiz, Muhamet, 2003. "Walrasian bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 465-487, November.
    6. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
    8. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    9. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
    10. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
    11. Walter Trockel, 2002. "A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 581-586.
    12. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
    13. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
    14. Trockel, Walter, 2017. "A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 310, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    15. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
    16. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    17. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
    18. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    19. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
    20. Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
    21. Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg, 1999. "A note on van Damme's mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(2), pages 179-187.
    22. Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 308, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    23. William Thomson, 2001. "On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(2), pages 327-386.
    24. Walter Trockel, 2000. "Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(2), pages 277-294.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    2. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2010. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 17-25, March.

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