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Fiscal delegation in a monetary union with decentralized public spending

Author

Listed:
  • Henrique S. Basso

    (Banco de España)

  • James Costain

    (Banco de España)

Abstract
This paper studies the effects of delegating control of sovereign debt issuance to an independent authority in a monetary union where public spending decisions are decentralized. The model assumes that no policy makers are capable of commitment to a rule. However, consistent with Rogoff (1985) and with the recent history of central banking, it assumes that an institution may be designed to have a strong preference for achieving some clear, simple, quantitative policy goal. Following Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), we show that in a monetary union where a single central bank interacts with many member governments, debt is excessive relative to a social planner’s solution. We extend their analysis by considering the establishment of an independent fiscal authority (IFA) mandated to maintain long-run budget balance. We show that delegating sovereign debt issuance to an IFA in each member state shifts down the time path of debt, because this eliminates aspects of deficit bias inherent in democratic politics. Delegating to a single IFA at the union level lowers debt further, because common pool problems across regions’ deficit choices are internalized. The establishment of a federal government with fiscal powers over the whole monetary union would be less likely to avoid excessive deficits, because only the second mechanism mentioned above would apply. Moreover, the effective level of public services would be lower, if centralized spending decisions are less informationally efficient

Suggested Citation

  • Henrique S. Basso & James Costain, 2013. "Fiscal delegation in a monetary union with decentralized public spending," Working Papers 1311, Banco de España.
    • Handle: RePEc:bde:wpaper:1311
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Giampaolo Arachi & Michele G Giuranno & Paola Profeta, 2018. "Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Inequality and Public Policies’, CESifo Economic Studies 2018," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 64(3), pages 339-344.
    2. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Dedola, Luca & Jarociński, Marek & Maćkowiak, Bartosz & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2019. "Macroeconomic stabilization, monetary-fiscal interactions, and Europe's monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 22-33.
    3. Luc Eyraud & Xavier Debrun & Andrew Hodge & Victor Duarte Lledo & Catherine A Pattillo, 2018. "Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 18/04, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Henrique S. Basso & James Costain, 2016. "Fiscal Delegation in a Monetary Union with Decentralized Public Spending," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 62(2), pages 256-288.
    5. Henrique S. Basso & James Costain, 2017. "Fiscal delegation in a monetary union: instrument assignment and stabilization properties," Working Papers 1710, Banco de España.
    6. Óscar Arce & Iván Kataryniuk & Paloma Marín & Javier J. Pérez, 2020. "Reflexiones sobre el diseño de un Fondo de Recuperación europeo," Occasional Papers 2014, Banco de España.
    7. Mackowiak, Bartosz & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Dedola, Luca & Schmidt, Sebastian & Jarocinski, Marek, 2017. "Macroeconomic Stabilization, Monetary-Fiscal Interactions, and Europe’s Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 12371, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Guilherme Bandeira, 2018. "Fiscal transfers in a monetary union with sovereign risk," Working Papers 1807, Banco de España.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fi scal authority; delegation; decentralization; monetary union; sovereign debt;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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