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An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests

Author

Listed:
  • Aner Sela

    (BGU)

  • Ishay Rabi

    (BGU)

  • Chen Cohen

    (BGU)

Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2023. "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers 2317, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2317
    as

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    File URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/2317.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2008. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 615-631, Springer.
    2. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
    3. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 59-71, September.
    4. Einy, E. & Haimanko, O. & Moreno, D. & Sela, A. & Shitovitz, B., 2015. "Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 241-245.
    5. Aner Sela, 2020. "Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 749-771, September.
    6. Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden, 2012. "The nature of tournaments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 289-313, October.
    7. Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2012. "The lifeboat problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 552-559.
    8. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela, 2020. "Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 333-345, October.
    9. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "Contest architecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 70-96, January.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2ldopuhqfp8e7oriqpulud8k5o is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Milchtaich, Igal, 1996. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-124, March.
    12. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2018. "The Distribution of Talent Across Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(609), pages 471-509, March.
    13. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2009. "Competition among contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 743-768, December.
    14. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2012. "Carrots And Sticks: Prizes And Punishments In Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 453-462, April.
    15. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
    16. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1996. "A Multi-winner Nested Rent-Seeking Contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 177-184, April.
    17. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu, 2012. "The optimal multi-stage contest," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 351-382, October.
    18. Xiao, Jun, 2016. "Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 178-221.
    19. Luis Corchón & Matthias Dahm, 2010. "Foundations for contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 81-98, April.
    20. Julio González-Díaz & Ron Siegel, 2013. "Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 835-844, November.
    21. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2010. "First In Village Or Second In Rome?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 263-288, February.
    22. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
    23. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2018. "The Distribution of Talent Across Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(609), pages 471-509.
    24. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-289, March.
    25. Wei-Torng Juang & Guang-Zhen Sun & Kuo-Chih Yuan, 2020. "A model of parallel contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 651-672, June.
    26. Takeshi Yamazaki, 2008. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure‐Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent‐Seeking Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 317-327, April.
    27. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Parallel contests; heterogenous agents. non-linear costs;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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