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Perfect Baysian Implementation in Economic Environments

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  • Brusco, S.
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Brusco, S., 1995. "Perfect Baysian Implementation in Economic Environments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 322.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:322.95
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
    2. Jackson, Matthew & Moulin, Hervé, 1992. "Implementing a public project and distributing its cost," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 125-140.
    3. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
    4. Bergin, James & Sen, Arunava, 1998. "Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 222-256, June.
    5. Brusco, Sandro, 1995. "Perfect Bayesian Implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(3), pages 419-444, May.
    6. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 668-691, June.
    7. Varian, Hal R, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1278-1293, December.
    8. John Duggan, 1998. "An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal/multi-agent environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(2), pages 167-191.
    9. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-477, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Baliga, Sandeep, 1999. "Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 173-183, May.
    2. Müller, Christoph, 2020. "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    3. Alejandro Francetich, 2013. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 501, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. Alejandro Francetich, 2015. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner's Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 45-76, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    INFORMATION; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM;

    JEL classification:

    • C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General

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