[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/09065.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: what are the driving forces?

Author

Listed:
  • Boeters, Stefan
Abstract
In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD-countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.

Suggested Citation

  • Boeters, Stefan, 2009. "Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: what are the driving forces?," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-065, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:09065
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/28612/1/611194597.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kees Folmer, 2009. "Why do macro wage elasticities diverge? A meta analysis," CPB Discussion Paper 122.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    2. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Peter Birch Sørensen, 2004. "Labour Tax Reform, the Good Jobs and the Bad Jobs," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(1), pages 45-64, March.
    3. Bovenberg, A. Lans & Graafland, Johan J. & de Mooij, Ruud A., 2000. "Tax reform and the Dutch labor market: an applied general equilibrium approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 193-214, October.
    4. Kees Folmer, 2009. "Why do macro wage elasticities diverge?," CPB Memorandum 224, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    5. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Razin, Assaf & Tesar, Linda L., 1994. "Effective tax rates in macroeconomics: Cross-country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 297-323, December.
    6. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2000. "Is tax progression really good for employment? A model with endogenous hours of work," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 79-93, January.
    7. Stefan Boeters, 2004. "Green Tax Reform and Employment: The Interaction of Profit and Factor Taxes," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 60(2), pages 222-239, August.
    8. Pissarides, Christopher A., 1998. "The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-183, January.
    9. Tuomala, Matti, 1990. "Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198286059.
    10. Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen & Kreiner, Claus Thustrup, 2006. "The marginal cost of public funds: Hours of work versus labor force participation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1955-1973, November.
    11. Michiel Evers & Ruud de Mooij & Daniel van Vuuren, 2005. "What explains the variation in estimates of labour supply elasticities?," CPB Discussion Paper 51, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    12. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    13. Stefan Boeters & Michael Feil, 2009. "Heterogeneous Labour Markets in a Microsimulation–AGE Model: Application to Welfare Reform in Germany," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 33(4), pages 305-335, May.
    14. Holmlund, B. & Kolm, A.S., 1995. "Progressive Taxation, Wage Setting and Unemployment - Theory and Swedish Evidence," Papers 15, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
    15. Rolf Aaberge & Ugo Colombino & Erling Holmøy & Birger Strøm & Tom Wennemo, 2004. "Population ageing and fiscal sustainability: An integrated micro-macro analysis of required tax changes," Discussion Papers 367, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    16. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 1997. "Wage bargaining, labor-tax progression, and welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 127-150, June.
    17. Fuest Clemens & Huber Bernd, 2001. "Tax Progression and Human Capital in Imperfect Labour Markets," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-18, February.
    18. Melanie Arntz & Stefan Boeters & Nicole Gürtzgen & Stefanie Schubert, 2006. "Analysing Welfare Reform in a Microsimulation-AGE Model," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 109, Society for Computational Economics.
    19. Hersoug, Tor, 1984. "Union Wage Responses to Tax Changes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 37-51, March.
    20. Arntz, Melanie & Boeters, Stefan & Gürtzgen, Nicole & Schubert, Stefanie, 2008. "Analysing welfare reform in a microsimulation-AGE model: The value of disaggregation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 422-439, May.
    21. Koskela, Erkki & Vilmunen, Jouko, 1996. "Tax progression is good for employment in popular models of trade union behaviour," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 65-80, August.
    22. Kees Folmer, 2009. "Why do macro wage elasticities diverge? A meta analysis," CPB Discussion Paper 122, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    23. Sorensen, Peter Birch, 1999. "Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 435-452, September.
    24. Erkki Koskela & Ronnie Schöb, 2012. "Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining and Individual Effort Determination," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 749-771, July.
    25. Ben Lockwood & Alan Manning, 1993. "Wage Setting and the Tax System: theory and Evidence for the UK," CEP Discussion Papers dp0115, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    26. Lockwood, Ben & Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, August.
    27. Kees Folmer, 2009. "Why do macro wage elasticities diverge?," CPB Memorandum 224.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    28. Symons, J & Layard, R, 1984. "Neoclassical Demand for Labour Functions for Six Major Economies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 788-799, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Boeters & Luc Savard, 2011. "The Labour Market in CGE Models," Cahiers de recherche 11-20, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    2. Stefan Boeters, 2013. "Optimal Tax Progressivity in Unionised Labour Markets: Simulation Results for Germany," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(4), pages 447-474, April.
    3. Chun‐Chieh Huang & Juin‐Jen Chang & Hsiao‐Wen Hung, 2020. "Progressive Tax and Inequality in a Unionized Economy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(1), pages 38-80, January.
    4. Boeters, Stefan & Savard, Luc, 2013. "The Labor Market in Computable General Equilibrium Models," Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, in: Peter B. Dixon & Dale Jorgenson (ed.), Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 1645-1718, Elsevier.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boeters, Stefan & Savard, Luc, 2011. "The labour market in CGE models," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-079, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Stefan Boeters & Nico van Leeuwen, 2010. "A labour market extension for WorldScan; modelling labour supply, wage bargaining and unemployment in a CGE framework," CPB Document 201.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Boeters, Stefan & Savard, Luc, 2013. "The Labor Market in Computable General Equilibrium Models," Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, in: Peter B. Dixon & Dale Jorgenson (ed.), Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 1645-1718, Elsevier.
    4. Bohringer, Christoph & Boeters, Stefan & Feil, Michael, 2005. "Taxation and unemployment: an applied general equilibrium approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 81-108, January.
    5. Bertil Holmlund, 2002. "Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(4), pages 415-430, November.
    6. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Bjørn Sandvik & Odd Rune Straume, 2004. "Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(4), pages 703-720, December.
    7. Etienne Lehmann & Claudio Lucifora & Simone Moriconi & Bruno Van der Linden, 2016. "Beyond the labour income tax wedge: the unemployment-reducing effect of tax progressivity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(3), pages 454-489, June.
    8. Hummel, Albert Jan & Jacobs, Bas, 2023. "Optimal income taxation in unionized labor markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    9. Boeters, Stefan, 2002. "Tax Progressivity and the Trade Union's Fallback-Option," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-15, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    10. Boeters, Stefan & Böhringer, Christoph & Feil, Michael, 2002. "Taxation and unemployment: an applied general equilibrium approach for Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-39, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    11. Stefan Boeters, 2013. "Optimal Tax Progressivity in Unionised Labour Markets: Simulation Results for Germany," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(4), pages 447-474, April.
    12. Holmlund Bertil & Söderström Martin, 2011. "Estimating Dynamic Income Responses to Tax Reform," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-38, November.
    13. Holmlund, Bertil & Söderström, Martin, 2008. "Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence," Working Paper Series 2008:28, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    14. Sinko, Pekka, 2004. "Progressive Taxation Under Centralised Wage Setting," Discussion Papers 349, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    15. Albert Jan Hummel & Bas Jacobs, 2018. "Optimal Income Taxation in Unionized Labor Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-064/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    16. Mathias Hungerbühler & Etienne Lehmann & Alexis Parmentier & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2006. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(3), pages 743-767.
    17. Albert Jan Hummel, 2021. "Unemployment and tax design," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-061/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. Florian Dorn & Clemens Fuest & Björn Kauder & Luisa Lorenz & Martin Mosler & Luisa Dörr, 2017. "The removal of the middle class bulge - models and costs," ifo Forschungsberichte, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 77, October.
    19. Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2011. "Optimal Tax Progression: Does it Matter if Wage Bargaining is Centralized or Decentralized?," Umeå Economic Studies 829, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    20. Gustafsson, Johan & Sjögren, Tomas, 2024. "Can Labor Market Imperfections Motivate the Implementation of an Income-Based Pension System?," Umeå Economic Studies 1024, Umeå University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    labour taxation; tax progressivity; optimal taxation; collective wage bargaining; unemployment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:09065. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zemande.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.