The Dark Side of the Force: Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Entry
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2017-10-22 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-EVO-2017-10-22 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2017-10-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-ORE-2017-10-22 (Operations Research)
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