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Moonlighting politicians: A survey and research agenda

Author

Listed:
  • Geys, Benny
  • Mause, Karsten
Abstract
Elected representatives in many countries are legally allowed to carry out (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate, often referred to as moonlighting. Despite the important selection and incentive effects such outside positions might engender, academic studies evaluating the prevalence, desirability and/or consequences of politicians' moonlighting have remained relatively scarce; often due to severe data restrictions. In recent years, however, more stringent disclosure rules have increased data availability, and large-sample analyses are becoming increasingly feasible. Besides surveying recent empirical contributions to this developing research field, this paper also outlines unresolved issues and thereby develops an agenda for future enquiry.

Suggested Citation

  • Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten, 2011. "Moonlighting politicians: A survey and research agenda," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-101, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Szakonyi, David, 2018. "Businesspeople in Elected Office: Identifying Private Benefits from Firm-Level Returns," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 322-338, May.
    2. Arnold, Felix & Kauder, Björn & Potrafke, Niklas, 2014. "Outside earnings, absence, and activity: Evidence from German parliamentarians," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 147-157.
    3. Alessandro Fedele & Paolo Naticchioni, 2016. "Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(2), pages 127-156, May.
    4. Bernecker, Andreas, 2014. "Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 55-70.
    5. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2016. "Supermajorities and Political Rent Extraction," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 65-81, February.
    6. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2017. "Voters and Representatives: How Should Representatives Be Selected?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2017-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    7. Nastassia Leszczynska, 2017. "Double Hat Politicians: Political Moonlighting in Wallonia," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-43, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. David Szakonyi, 2020. "Indecent Disclosures: Anti-Corruption Reforms and Political Selection," Working Papers 2020-21, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    9. Björn Kauder & Manuela Krause & Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Electoral cycles in MPs’ salaries: evidence from the German states," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(4), pages 981-1000, August.
    10. Benny Geys, 2013. "Election Cycles in MPs' Outside Interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005–2010," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 61(2), pages 462-472, June.
    11. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Marina Riem, 2017. "Do Parties Punish MPs for Voting Against the Party Line?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 63(3), pages 317-332.
    12. Polk Andreas, 2020. "What do we Know About Lobbying in Germany?," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 71(1), pages 43-79, April.
    13. Felix Arnold & Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2014. "Beeinträchtigen Nebeneinkünfte die politischen Tätigkeiten von Bundestagsabgeordneten?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(18), pages 34-39, September.
    14. Hofer. Katharina, 2016. "Shirk or Work? On How Legislators React to Monitoring," Economics Working Paper Series 1616, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    15. A. Fedele & P. Giannoccolo, 2013. "Moneycracy," Working Papers wp893, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    16. Green, Colin P. & HomRoy, Swarnodeep, 2020. "Bringing Connections Onboard: The Value of Political Influence," IZA Discussion Papers 13392, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Gianmarco Daniele & Benny Geys, 2015. "Exposing politicians’ ties to criminal organizations: the effects of local government dissolutions on electoral outcomes in southern Italian municipalities," Working Papers 2015/41, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    18. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Alexander Stecher, 2015. "Stell doch einfach Deine Frau an! Die Verwandtenaffäre in Bayern – der Untersuchung zweiter Teil," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 68(20), pages 20-24, October.

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    Keywords

    Moonlighting; outside interests; outside income; shirking; disclosure rules;
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