Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation
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- Matthias Kräkel, 2010. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages, and Litigation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 337-364.
- Gürtler, Oliver & Kräkel, Matthias, 2007. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 214, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Cited by:
- Esteve-González, Patricia, 2016.
"Moral hazard in repeated procurement of services,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 244-269.
- Esteve González, Patrícia, 2014. "Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services," Working Papers 2072/237593, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Kirkegaard, René, 2023. "Endogenous criteria for success," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
- Baharad, Roy & Cohen, Chen & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2022. "Litigation with adversarial efforts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
- Yu, Xinning & Lan, Yanfei & Zhao, Ruiqing, 2021. "Strategic green technology innovation in a two-stage alliance: Vertical collaboration or co-development?," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
double-sided moral hazard; efficiency wage; litigation contest; settlement;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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