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One-bound core games

Author

Listed:
  • Gong, Doudou
  • Dietzenbacher, Bas

    (RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory)

  • Peters, Hans

    (RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, RS: FSE DACS Mathematics Centre Maastricht, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory)

Abstract
This paper introduces the new class of one-bound core games, where the core can be described by either a lower bound or an upper bound on the payoffs of the players, named lower bound core games and upper bound core games, respectively. We study the relation of the class of one-bound core games with several other classes of games and characterize the new class by the structure of the core and in terms of Davis-Maschler reduced games. We also provide explicit expressions and axiomatic characterizations of the nucleolus for one-bound core games, and show that the nucleolus coincides with the Shapley value when these games are convex.

Suggested Citation

  • Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans, 2023. "One-bound core games," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2023003
    DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2023003
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lloyd S. Shapley, 1967. "On balanced sets and cores," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(4), pages 453-460.
    2. Peter Sudhölter & Yan-An Hwang, 2001. "Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 597-623.
    3. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Morton Davis & Michael Maschler, 1965. "The kernel of a cooperative game," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 223-259, September.
    5. Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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