Can Communication Mitigate Strategic Delays in Investment Timing?
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- Ay?e Gül Mermer & Sander Onderstal & Joep Sonnemans, 2022. "Can Communication Mitigate Strategic Delays in Investment Timing?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-065/I, Tinbergen Institute.
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More about this item
Keywords
stochastic volatility; social cost of carbon; climate damage; Duffie-Epstein preference;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENV-2023-07-31 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2023-07-31 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2023-07-31 (Game Theory)
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